UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA (RENO)

IN RE: . Case No. 20-50660-gs

. Chapter 7

METAL RECOVERY SOLUTIONS,

INC.,

Debtor.

.

CHRISTOPHER P. BURKE, in his . Adv. No. 21-05066-gs

Capacity as Chapter 7 Trustee . of METAL RECOVERY SOLUTIONS, . INC., .

Plaintiff,

v. 300 Booth Street

. Reno, NV 89509

METAL RECOVERY SOLUTIONS, .

INC., et al., . Wednesday, April 5, 2023

Defendants. . 9:41 a.m.

.

TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION TO SELL CLAIMS AND OTHER
BANKRUPTCY ESTATE ASSETS FILED BY MICHAEL LEHNERS ON
BEHALF OF CHRISTOPHER P. BURKE [68];
STATUS HEARING RE: ADVERSARY CASE 21-05066, COMPLAINT FILED BY
CHRISTOPHER P. BURKE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE OF
METAL RECOVERY SOLUTIONS, INC. VS. METAL RECOVERY SOLUTIONS,
INC., THOMAS SEAL, JETTE SEAL, DIFFERENTIAL ENGINEERING, INC.,
MARK SHONNARD, FEE AMOUNT 350 [1]

BEFORE THE HONORABLE GARY SPRAKER
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT JUDGE

Audio Operator: David Lindersmith, ECR

Transcription Company: Access Transcripts, LLC

10110 Youngwood Lane Fishers, IN 46048 (855) 873-2223

www.accesstranscripts.com

Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

APPEARANCES:

For Christopher P.

Burke:

MICHAEL LEHNERS, ESQ.

429 Marsh Avenue Reno, NV 89509 (775) 786-1695

For Element Global,

Inc.:

Law Offices of Amy N. Tirre, P.C.

By: AMY N. TIRRE, ESQ. 3715 Lakeside Drive

Reno, NV 89509 (775) 828-0909

For Thomas Seal and

Jette Seal:

Fletcher & Lee

By: ELIZABETH A. FLETCHER, ESQ.

448 Ridge Street Reno, NV 89501 (775) 324-1011

For Geo-Logic

Associates, Inc.:

Kaempfer Crowell

By: LOUIS M. BUBALA, III, ESQ.

50 West Liberty Street, Suite 700

Reno, NV 89501 (775) 852-3900

Rutan & Tucker LLP

By: RONALD P. OINES, ESQ.

18575 Jamboree Road, 9th Floor

Irvine, California 92612

(714) 641-5100

For Jex Technologies

Corp.:

Foley & Lardner LLP

By: ELLEN E. OSTROW, ESQ.

95 South State Street, Suite 2500

Salt Lake City, UT 84111

(801) 401-8952

For Differential

Engineering, Inc.:

Woodburn and Wedge

By: SETH J. ADAMS, ESQ.

6100 Neil Road, Suite 500

P.O. Box 2311 Reno, NV 89505 (775) 688-3000

Also Present:

CHRISTOPHER P. BURKE, ESQ.

GEORGE YOUNG, ESQ.

1

(Proceedings commence at 9:41 a.m.) 1 THE COURT: All right. Good morning. This is Judge 2 Spraker. We are on record in person for three related matters, 3 both in the Metal Recovery Solutions main case on a motion to 4 settle claims and compromise, as well as the adversary --5 related adversary Burke v. Metal Recovery Solutions, et al, 6 also on a motion to settle claims and other relief, and the 7 status hearing in the adversary. And with that, good morning. 8 9 It's a pleasure to see everybody in person. It's been a while. 10 As you saw another person coming in with me is extern. Glad 11 that things are somewhat getting back to normal. So with that, 12 welcome, and we'll take appearances. 13 And Mr. Lehners, would you please lead us off. 14 MR. LEHNERS: Good morning, Your Honor. Mike Lehners 15 appearing on behalf of Chapter 7 Trustee Christopher Burke, who 16 is seated to my right. 17 THE COURT: Thank you. Good morning. 18 MR. OINES: Good morning, Your Honor. Ron Oines for 19 Creditor Geo-Logic Associates, Inc., and Mr. Bubala is here 20 with me, and also Gary Lass of GLA. 21 THE COURT: Thank you. Good morning. 2.2 MS. FLETCHER: Good morning, Your Honor. Elizabeth 2.3 Fletcher on behalf of the Seals. 2.4 THE COURT: Thank you. 25 MS. OSTROW: Good morning, Your Honor. Ellen Ostrow

```
on behalf of Jex Technologies. Also present in the courtroom
 1
    is Dave McMullin, CEO and chairman of Jex Technologies; and
 2
    also George Young, general counsel for Jex Technologies.
 3
 4
              THE COURT: Thank you and good morning.
              MR. ADAMS: Good morning, Your Honor. Seth Adams on
 5
    behalf of Differential Engineering.
 6
 7
              THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Adams.
 8
              MS. TIRRE: Good morning, Your Honor. Amy Tirre on
 9
    behalf of Element Global Inc. through its agent, Empire Capital
10
    Management, LLC.
11
              THE COURT: Thank you, good morning.
12
              MS. TIRRE: And it's a potential bidder.
                                                        Thank you.
13
              THE COURT: I understand, and welcome.
14
              THE COURT: All right. First order of business, I
15
    believe, Mr. Lehners, is to bring me up to speed. I've read
16
    what has been filed, but why don't you go ahead and let me
17
    know, obviously with Ms. Tirre's participation, in the case
18
    that some things are going on that I might not be aware of.
19
              MR. LEHNERS: Your Honor, I'm happy to. Thank you,
20
    and good morning. Your Honor, this motion is -- was originally
21
    to approve the sale of claims and assets to GLA for $1,150,000
2.2
    in cash. The motion was filed on February 23rd, Docket Number
2.3
    255.
2.4
              On March 17th, Jex submitted an over-bid by email for
25
    $1.2 million cash on the same terms. That's acknowledged in
```

2.

2.2

2.3

2.4

Jex's opposition at Docket 294. The assets which are being purchased are attached or described in Exhibit 2 for my motion for sale. And largely they, the tangible assets are the trailers, related equipment, and the intangible assets are the property rights of the debtor, the appeal pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals of the GLA judgment, as well as the Trustee's adversaries claims, which are filed by me.

Depending on who purchases these assets, it will

Depending on who purchases these assets, it will involve a compromise of one or more claims, as well as a 363(b) sale analysis. My motion in reply set forth the applicable standards regarding 363(b) and 9019, and I also refer to evidence in the record to support the relevant standards. And again, depending upon who the highest bidder is, that's going to be a function of what, if any, claims are compromised. So, while I would like to suggest to you that maybe it would be better to allow the bidding to go forward first, since the highest bidder may eliminate several or all of the objections before you since it involves 9019, but I defer to you, Your Honor, on that.

THE COURT: I -- and I defer to you. I'm fine with that, I think that makes a lot of sense. The problem is going to make -- is going to be making sure that we understand the apples and the oranges.

MR. LEHNERS: Of course.

THE COURT: Obviously between the bidders that have

```
kind of circled who gets what. You know, if it is a sale to
 1
    GLA, there really is no compromise, right, because it is a
 2.
    purchase of the causes of action. It is not settling those
 3
    causes of action, as I understand it.
 5
              MR. LEHNERS: It's settling one. And that would be
    the appeal of --
 6
 7
              THE COURT: And that's part of the problem, right?
 8
              MR. LEHNERS: Exactly.
 9
              THE COURT: Yes, keeping the grid --
              MR. LEHNERS: Yes.
10
11
              THE COURT: -- so that we know how to do that.
12
    There's been instances where, you know, it's very easy in the
13
    auction process to lose that grid, and that can complicate
14
    things if there's further review required. So I am trying to
15
    make sure that we keep that clear so that, you know, I can
16
    understand what is the best --
17
              MR. LEHNERS: Of course.
18
              THE COURT: -- and most appropriate offer. And if
19
    there is any further review, then that will be clear as well,
20
    on a cold record.
21
              MR. LEHNERS: All right. Your Honor, may I proceed
2.2
    then with a brief analysis?
2.3
              THE COURT: Sure.
2.4
              MR. LEHNERS: Okay.
25
              THE COURT: I would appreciate it.
```

MR. LEHNERS: I'd like to turn to 363(b) first. The
analysis is well set forth in the Alaska Fishing Adventure,
<u>LLC</u> , and the Court there recognized the ultimate objective of
liquidating the estate in a manner that is most advantageous to
creditors. Thus, the matter will ultimately rest in the
judgment and discretion of the Trustee. And a bankruptcy
court, according to that opinion, should determine only whether
the Trustee's judgment was reasonable, and whether a sound
business justification exists supporting the sale and its
terms. We have set forth the reasons why Mr. Burke's trustee
judgment was reasonable. Mr. Burke has spent hours and hours,
as have I, negotiating sales with Jex, the Seals, and GLA.
While these negotiations were kept confidential under Federal
Rule of Evidence 408, it did promote three offers. Each one
was better than the last, and that leaves us here today with a
\$1.2 million cash offer. This came about because of
Mr. Burke's hard work.
Now, one of the things that I felt was important in
this analysis is called constrained competition. This is
explained in the Lahijani case. A sale to competitor is
permitted, which is constrained competition, but it warrants
more scrutiny. And in <u>Lahijani</u> , the only bidders were one
defendant acting on behalf of fellow defendants and plaintiffs
who held about 70 percent of the claims.
In reversing, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel noticed

2.

2.2

2.3

2.4

In other words, if it sells for this, there is a certain percentage added on to the estate. That had a value greater than zero, and it was error for the trustee to reject that because the trustee wanted certainty. In other words, the guiding principle is that the Court's obligation in a Section 363 sale is to assure that optimal value is realized by the

And here, we're dealing with patented technology that is subject to a protective order, and Mr. Burke has done the best that he can to negotiate and get the bidding up. He has maximized the value.

That takes us to the compromise of claims. I'm going to go through briefly all of them, because I think they're relevant depending upon who the bidder is going to be. The first one I'd like to talk about is the appeal pending before the Ninth Circuit, which is the appeal of GLA's \$2.3 million arbitration award given by Judge Pro. When I went over the ANC Properties factors, I looked to the probability of success of that litigation. Mr. Burke and I, and Mr. Burke is also a licensed attorney who has done a lot of appeals, I've done a lot of appeals, and we concurred that the probability of success for Dr. Seals is low, unfortunately. Judge Pro made express findings that the handwritten notes support an agreement for a 70/30 split.

estate under the circumstances.

2.2

2.3

2.4

I did the research for the standard of review on findings of fact in an arbitration award. The standard is clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous where although there is evidence to support it, a reviewing court, on the entire evidence, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Judge Pro made an express finding that there was, or were handwritten notes evidencing a contract for a 70/30 split. I believe that finding alone precludes a clearly erroneous finding.

I also read Mr. Oines's brief, and I also believe that a judgment had been entered, or could have been entered for quantum meruit, meaning that if there were not a contract, GLA would still be entitled to recoup the fair value conferred upon the Seals and the debtor.

The difficulties in collection is the next prong. If this appeal were successful by the Seals, or MRS rather, it would probably only prolong litigation if the Ninth Circuit were to order the District Court to make additional findings. That would most likely be appealed by the non-prevailing party, so delay becomes the difficulty in collection.

The third is the complexity of litigation. The complexion — the litigation is complex. This involves a complaint filed by GLA in September of 2017. There's a very large record regarding this appeal, it is complex, and it would take time.

2.

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

2.3

2.4

25

Last, and perhaps most important of the ANC Properties factors is the interest of the creditors, and proper deference to their reasonable views in the premises. That is considered paramount. The appeal adds no money to the estate. It would only cost more time. For that reason, it is the trustee's business judgment, and mine, that a sale of the appeal and related assets for what we have now, and may have more, 1.2 million, it pays creditors now, and that is the paramount thing that we look at, it's bringing in --THE COURT: But let me interrupt on that, because this is raising a point that another recent case of mine has also raised. I think you've laid it out wonderfully and correctly, and primary, you know, factor is the best interest of the creditors. But the creditors here are limited non-insider to Brownstein Hyatt for 61,000, Gill Gallagher (phonetic) for 1,500. Differential has been the subject of the claim objections. MR. LEHNERS: Yes. THE COURT: We know what's happened so they are out, leaving Geo-Logic. MR. LEHNERS: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: And it's the only other creditor. that calculus get factored into the primary interest of the creditors? Because, you know it's an odd mix. MR. LEHNERS: It does, Your Honor. Lahijani tells us

2.

3

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

2.3

2.4

25

it does. In Lahijani, we had a plaintiff that had 70 percent of the claims. Here, GLA has a greater percentage, but they had the majority percentage. And what the BAP told us is that it warrants more strict scrutiny. In other words, we're not going to give it passing deference. We're going to get under the hood and see what's going on under this. That's why I did the detailed analysis that I did. So with respect to GLA being the biggest creditor on the block, that is true; however, the size of the claim doesn't necessarily defeat the analysis. means we go deeper into it, and that's what I've tried to do. Does that answer your question? THE COURT: It does. It may spur some additional questions as we go along that line, but it does. Thank you. MR. LEHNERS: Thank you, Your Honor. Next is the adversary complaint that I filed on behalf of Chapter 7 Trustee. There are 11 claims in that. Two of them are moot because it had to do with the perfection of Differential Engineering's proofs of claim, and that's now been rendered moot. But all boiled down, it comes down to really three. claim for alter eqo, which would be Dr. Seal and Differential Engineering and the debtor, claims for fraudulent transfers, and Dr. Seal's and his wife's breach of fiduciary duty as officers of the debtor. So when I go again through the ANC factors, the probability of success, Your Honor, I have extensively cited

2.

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

2.3

2.4

25

the record in two respects. The first are your March 31st, 2022 findings of fact. That's Docket Number 202. And I've also read carefully the opinion, which is unpublished, from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel that affirmed your decision. And that is what I have in the record, and this is what these facts are referenced from. You will find most of that analysis in the reply that I filed with the relevant citations. But what was found is that the Seals are the directors and the shareholders of the debtor, Metal Recovery Solutions. The Seals own 100 percent of the debtor's stock. Dr. Seal is also the sole owner and president of Differential Engineering, making it an affiliate. It is undisputed that there were transfers and distributions from the debtor to the Seals totaling \$1.2 million in 2019. This was in two transfers, one on May 24th of 2019; the second on June 3rd, 2019. This was while the GLA suit was pending, and was also prior to Judge Pro's September 21st, 2019 award. Also in 2019, in particular January and July, the debtor executed separate secured promissory notes in favor of differential engineering. Together, they total \$1,735,565. Most notably, this was for antecedent debt. Also most notably is that the notes were collateralized by significantly all of the debtor's assets: the trailers, the equipment, the bank accounts. Most interesting, the debtor's statement of financial affairs when the debtor filed showed gross revenue

2.

2.2

2.3

2.4

for the 2019 year of only \$110,000. The \$60,000 bonuses called for under the note to Differential Engineering were inconsistent with the contract. Why? Because the bonuses were to be paid a percentage.

What I recall from our evidentiary hearing is that the percentage was to be one half of the pre-tax profits. And we had two years where the pre-tax profits were close to 4 million, and another one I think it was near 1 million, yet that was not split. But we did have several years where there were no pre-tax profits, yet \$60,000 in bonuses were paid.

At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Seal was unable to answer the question of how and on what basis it was to be decided when Metal Recovery Solutions had enough money in operating capital to warrant making payments to Differential with respect to the notes. And in 2016 and 2017, Metal Recovery Solutions did have sufficient cash reserves, but it did not pay Differential Engineering on the notes, only the monthly fee.

In Nevada, our legislature has codified the alter ego doctrine. It basically says that no person other than a corporation is individually liable for a debt of that corporation, with one exception, unless that person acts as alter ego of the corporation. The legislature then codified the three elements of alter ego as recognized by Nevada Supreme Court precedent. The corporation is influenced and governed by

```
the person. There is such an unity of interest and ownership
 1
    that the corporation and the person are inseparable from each
 2.
    other, and adherents to the notion of the corporation being an
 3
    entity separate from that person would sanction fraud or
 4
    promote manifest injustice.
 5
              The evidence that I have set forth in the record
 6
    meets those, or at least I think there's a substantial
 7
 8
    likelihood that the trustee could prevail. And if the Seals
 9
    and Differential Engineering are the alter egos of the debtor,
10
    then each is liable for the debtor's claims. If each is liable
11
    for the debtor's claims, that means the assets of those two
12
    entities become estate property. That would include both the
13
    patent, and the rights to license it. The following are set
14
    forth --
15
              THE COURT: Is there a Nevada state decision that
16
    applies that result as alter ego?
17
              MR. LEHNERS: Your Honor, there's LFC goes back and
18
    talks about -- oh, I think it's McCleary Land and Cattle [sic],
19
    which may have been overruled on other grounds. But LFC
20
    recognized not only piercing, but reverse piercing. It applies
21
    both. Another --
2.2
              THE COURT: But did they do that?
2.3
              MR. LEHNERS: I'm sorry?
2.4
              THE COURT: Did they do that as a matter of
25
    transferring title versus imposing liability. Or if you wanted
```

to consider it a different way, alter ego as extension of 1 liability versus substantive consolidation in bankruptcy to 2 fuse the two entities, thereby transferring title of one into 3 the dominant? MR. LEHNERS: I would agree that that's the result. 5 6 But the way LFC explained is it, is that in a standard 7 piercing, you are basically taking an individual who owes a 8 debt and attacking the corporation seeking to pierce the 9 corporate veil to get the corporation's assets to satisfy the 10 individual's debt. 11 THE COURT: To -- or alternatively, to make that --12 or to recognize that alter ego's liability for the other's 13 debts. 14 MR. LEHNERS: I agree. 15 THE COURT: But there is a difference between 16 extension of liability and the ownership of assets. 17 MR. LEHNERS: Well, Your Honor, it is a distinction. 18 But in the event that it doesn't become owned by the debtor, 19 the debtor has a right to take it. And it would become 20 property of the estate. For example, in the classic alter ego 21 doctrine, I control a corporation as if it were my own, but it 2.2 has a rental property. I am liable for a \$100,000 judgment. 2.3 My creditor would be able to make an alter ego claim against my 2.4 corporation, and if successful, my corporation is liable with 25 me on that claim. And since corporations can't claim

exemptions, that creditor could take the rental house in that corporation. That is classic veil piercing.

THE COURT: How do they take it though?

MR. LEHNERS: Writ of execution.

2.2

2.3

2.4

THE COURT: Writ of execution leading to foreclosure. They do not own it. Whereas, again, overlaying the state law versus subsequent consolidation. Upon consolidation, that debtor owns that condominium.

MR. LEHNERS: The in this case the Supreme Court has held you cannot add somebody by motion to a judgment. You have to bring an independent action for alter ego. If you are successful under our statute, that entity is liable for the debt. And what that means is that that entity can collect as if it were jointly liable with the debtor, and be able to claim whatever exemptions are applicable. Your Honor, it's much akin to a 542 turnover action. Somebody owes the estate money. I have a right to collect it, but in order to do so, I have to file a lawsuit. If successful, I get the money. It's the same principle here.

So is it property of the estate? To be honest with you, it's a right to get property into the estate. Does the estate own it at that time? No. Alter ego has to be established, and then once established, the asset has to be attached. Once attached, then it becomes property of the estate, just like a turnover action. At least, that's my best

quess, sir. 1 2 THE COURT: All right. MR. LEHNERS: Reverse piercing is the opposite. 3 Reverse piercing takes place where the corporation is found to 4 be the alter ego of a director or some other entity. And 5 instead of piercing a human's corporate interest to attach the 6 corporate assets, the corporation is now -- the creditors of 7 the corporation are now going after the individual that caused 8 that. That's what reverse piercing is. And the important 10 cases on that are McCleary Cattle, LFC, and Judge Markell's 11 comments in In re Giampietro, which involved is an LLC subject 12 to alter ego like a corporation. He concluded that it was. 13 But I enjoyed the decision. I thought it did a good job of 14 setting it out. 15 The LFC case does talk about five factors that 16 should be examined for a finding of alter ego. Those are 17 comingling of funds, undercapitalization, unauthorized 18 diversion of funds, treatment of corporate assets as the 19 individual's own, the failure to observe corporate formalities. Without repeating myself, I believe I set forth this Court's 20 21 findings as well as the BAP, and I believe that they hold sway 2.2 on these five factors. 2.3 THE COURT: You know, I appreciate the detail that 2.4 you're giving us, but I also think that your initial point as

to who gets -- who may prevail will greatly affect whether we

25

```
go down this in further detail versus if it is a sale, then it
 1
    is just a sale of that asset and that cause of action.
 2
 3
              MR. LEHNERS: Right.
              THE COURT: And I appreciate the level of detail.
 4
    don't mean to cut you off, but I think depending on the
 5
    outcome, we may need to continue this depending on the status
 6
    of any objections afterwards. But I don't know if we need to
 7
 8
    go completely through this at this time, if that makes sense.
 9
              MR. LEHNERS: Sure. Your Honor, if I could offer an
10
    observation? We're selling a bundle of rights, a pocket full
11
    of lottery tickets, but the rights haven't been quantified yet.
12
    What we are required to do, we can't just say we've got a claim
13
    for alter ego and leave it at that. We have to handicap it.
14
    Now, we can't predict what the outcome is going to be, and I
15
    did not mean for my in-depth analysis to try to do so. I was
16
    only trying to handicap it and predict what is likely to
17
    happen. Even in ANC, they say we don't need a mini trial of
18
    this.
19
              THE COURT: Sure.
20
              MR. LEHNERS: We need to predict the probability, and
21
    that's all I'm doing.
2.2
              THE COURT: Let me ask -- zoom out just a little bit.
2.3
              MR. LEHNERS: Please.
2.4
              THE COURT: Because as you indicated and mentioned at
25
    the beginning, the sticks that are both tangible and
```

```
intangible.
 1
 2
              MR. LEHNERS: Yes.
              THE COURT: And depending upon who the buyer may be,
 3
    that calculus kind of shifts. But has there been any, I don't
 4
    want to say allocation, but in coming up with the purchase
 5
    price, and now trying to measure competing bids, how does the
 6
 7
    trustee look a purchase now at the 1.2, as between the
    tangible, the trailers and the associated, and the intangible,
 8
    the causes of action and the different lawsuits that we are now
10
    going through? Is there anything that you can give me as to
11
    the weight, the valuation now as to Jex? Because when Jex --
12
              MR. LEHNERS: Sure.
1.3
              THE COURT: -- is the bidder, it moves the pieces.
14
    It helps on certain things, and maybe not so much on others.
15
    So when we get to any competing bids --
16
              MR. LEHNERS: Yes.
17
              THE COURT: -- from Differential or Ms. Tirre's
18
    client, how do I mark that as a valuation of the whole?
19
              MR. LEHNERS: Well, Your Honor, a bundle of rights
20
    means that bought a dispute, and we have not won judgment yet.
21
    There are going to be defenses to it. I've tried to outline
2.2
    what those are, and clearly the trailers are linked to license,
2.3
    and they're linked to the technology.
2.4
              THE COURT: To be clear, and you know, I apologize
25
    for interrupting --
```

MR. LEHNERS: No. 1 THE COURT: -- but this sale is as is, where is --2 3 MR. LEHNERS: Yes. THE COURT: -- as to the trailer. You are simply, I 4 want to put this on the record, just so my understanding is 5 clear, is you are selling the physical trailers, and then 6 7 whatever may come as of it? 8 MR. LEHNERS: We are selling the existing trailers, subject to the rights that the lessee would have under state 9 10 In other words, I cannot stand here, nor will I stand 11 here today and say that the purchaser of those trailers, if not 12 Jex, gets the trailers free and clear of the lease. I cannot 13 say that because that has not been found. That claim has not 14 been made. The only thing that I brought up was the 15 exclusivity of the license. And I referred to the minutes on 16 that, and the minutes show that the debtor also had the right 17 to use the license as well as Jex, and the only other way that the license could be deemed non-exclusive is if somebody were 18 19 to prevail on the alter ego theory against Differential and 20 Dr. Seal. Then that person would have the right to attach the 21 patent from Dr. Seal, it's not exempt, and the lessor rights of 2.2 Differential Engineering, if it is the --2.3 THE COURT: And that is the Trustee's view. 2.4 Obviously, we haven't heard from anybody else, there may be 25 differences as to that.

```
MR. LEHNERS: Your Honor, I don't want to presume and
 1
    speak for Mr. Burke. I'd like him to give his opinion on that.
 2
 3
              THE COURT: You can stay seated, Mr. Burke. That's
    fine.
 4
              MR. BURKE: Thank you, Your Honor. Christopher
 5
 6
    Burke, Chapter 7 Trustee. I'm not sure exactly the question
 7
    that was being posed, except in terms of the trailers, there's
    money owed on the trailers. There's about 750,000 still owed.
 8
 9
    And in the normal course, if that was paid, that's it, the
10
    trustee is out, and the trailers become Jex. So at this point,
11
    we're selling the right to receive that money.
12
              MR. LEHNERS: Thank you, Mr. --
13
              THE COURT: And that is without assumption of the
14
    lease?
              MR. LEHNERS: Well --
15
16
              THE COURT: Right?
17
              MR. LEHNERS: -- Your Honor, we are selling -- as Jex
18
    pointed out, the lease basically says pay us this, and they're
19
    yours. I think it qualifies -- I think it -- each side has the
20
    right to cancel the lease, but most leases have a residual at
21
    the end, this does not. Once you've made all the payments,
2.2
    they're yours. So if Jex continues to make the payments on
2.3
    that, it's theirs. I don't know what performance is remaining
2.4
    on the estate side --
25
              THE COURT: Well --
```

```
MR. LEHNERS: -- so I don't even know if it is an
 1
 2
    executory contract.
              THE COURT: That's what I -- that's kind -- part of
 3
    what I'm saying. There are arguments here, and they intersect
 4
 5
    and crisscross. So until we figure out who the actual buyer
    is, I don't know which arguments will be represented and what
 6
    format. One of them is there's a stated lease.
 7
 8
              MR. LEHNERS: Right.
 9
              THE COURT: The lease was not assumed. We know what
10
    happens to leases that are not assumed in Chapter 7. They're
11
    rejected. This has indicia of -- it has a purchase option; 1
12
    million total is paid. It is owned by Jex. We also know that
13
    there are disguised leases that are truly sales. That's a
14
    different.
15
              MR. LEHNERS: Right.
16
              THE COURT: But all this kind of goes, I mean we're
17
    now into the same unknow as to the tangible property, and
18
    that's before we even get to the issues regarding the
19
    technology itself --
20
              MR. LEHNERS: Right.
21
              THE COURT: -- which Differential says is tied to
2.2
    those trailers --
2.3
              MR. LEHNERS: Right.
2.4
              THE COURT: -- and therefore raises issues. Issues
25
    can often mean disputes, which can often mean lawsuits.
```

point I'm trying to make is that all this is being sold as it. 1 Whatever the trustee has, without knowing exactly what it has 2. is up for auction and has drawn three bids so far. 3 MR. LEHNERS: Yes. THE COURT: So if Differential is correct and they 5 somehow convince that those trailers are so tied to the 6 technology that nobody else can functionally use them, so be it 7 8 under state law or however you litigate it. That is -- that's the main point that I want to emphasize for this. There is a 10 number of disputes, not only in the causes of action, but 11 actually with the physical property being sold out, too. 12 MR. LEHNERS: Your Honor, that's absolutely correct. 1.3 THE COURT: Okay. 14 MR. LEHNERS: And I'm glad I asked Mr. Burke the 15 question, because taking the trailers with the lease is the 16 right to receive another \$700,000. 17 THE COURT: If it is a disquised sale. 18 MR. LEHNERS: Well, again, is it in an executory 19 contract? What's the performance remaining due on both sides? 20 You see, once Jex pays, or whoever pays on the lease, they make 21 that last payment, signing over the title is nothing. In other 2.2 words, there's really nothing remaining performance-wise on the 2.3 estate except to cash the checks that Jex has been sending it. 2.4 And then when it sends the last check in, then the trailers 25 would be signed over. But even if you were to find --

```
1
              THE COURT: Is that how -- well, I mean, if Jex is
    currently the bid on the board?
 2
 3
              MR. LEHNERS: Yes.
              THE COURT: So classic example, if Jex prevails, this
 4
 5
    is not an issue, right?
 6
              MR. LEHNERS: Agreed.
 7
              THE COURT: They buy it; there's no more payments; it
    is owned free and clear --
 8
 9
              MR. LEHNERS: Right.
              THE COURT: -- and nobody else is going to dispute
10
11
           If GLA were to purchase it, then they can --
12
    oversimplifying this in my mind, there's two options. They can
13
    either assert ownership of the trailer, or they can assert the
14
    validity of the lease, maybe, and the income stream. But those
15
    are two different possibilities that are not being resolved
16
    today.
17
              MR. LEHNERS: They can't be resolved today --
18
              THE COURT: Okay.
19
              MR. LEHNERS: -- Your Honor. And I believe that's
20
    even clarified in the terms sheet, that these are claims
21
    subject to defenses, and we make no quarantee as to the
2.2
    outcome. And I will state for the record again, we are not
2.3
    making any quarantee as to the outcome. I'm only pointing out,
2.4
    again, in an analysis to handicap it, that is it an executory
25
    contract? I think not, because of the performance, but maybe
```

```
1
    it is.
              THE COURT: Well, let's be clear, too, because some
 2
    of the original motion indicated this was sale free and clear
 3
    of liens.
              MR. LEHNERS: Yes.
 5
              THE COURT: And, you know, the 363(m) suggests that
 6
    is. Usually when you sell a physical piece of property, you
 7
    get it, and the free and clear of liens generally means no
 8
    debt, secured debt against it. That isn't necessarily the
10
    issue here --
11
              MR. LEHNERS: No.
12
              THE COURT: -- but free and clear of interest may
13
    come into play if, say, GLA were to purchase it, and Jex
14
    continues to have a right to purchase that under the lease,
15
    which may or not be -- may or may not be a lease, right?
16
              MR. LEHNERS: Right.
17
              THE COURT: So --
18
              MR. LEHNERS: And --
19
              THE COURT: Is it -- but what is the free and clear
20
    aspect of that as to the trailer? Or again, we're now down
21
    another rabbit hole I've taken you on, which may be we need to
2.2
    have the auction and see what that means.
2.3
              MR. LEHNERS: Your Honor, that's a very good point.
2.4
    But when I say free and clear of claims, it means I'm not
25
    altering claims under state law. That usually means that if
```

2.

3

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

2.3

2.4

25

there's a security interest, we have to satisfy the provisions of 363(f). We don't have a secured claim here. The estate is not a secured creditor. It has leased the trailers to Jex. The lease was not assumed. That constitutes technically a breach, but breaches can be waived by subsequent performance and ratification, as has happened here. These are defenses that may come up with respect to the nature and quality of the asset being purchased, as opposed to an absolute claim, say for a lien for an amount specific that is being sold free and clear. You see, Your Honor, it has more to do with describing the nature of the asset being sold, which in turn is a function of state law regarding the property rights of these assets instead of a third-party creditor saying I have a claim to that asset because I have a perfected Article 9 security interest. It's a very, very close distinction on this. very hard to parse. And maybe I did go too deep into the rabbit hole with this analysis, but this is what we get when we look at trees instead of forests, or so I've been told. But, Your Honor, again, you are correct, and I can see that it is important to make for the record. What the trustee has is what the trustee is selling. He is a neutral party. He is a fiduciary to all of the creditors. something that is worth money. If all these questions that you've raised regarding the lease rights, the technology rights, the patent technology rights, if all of those had been

firmly and hardly resolved, we'd probably be getting a lot more money right now. But because --

THE COURT: Or not.

2.2

2.3

2.4

MR. LEHNERS: Or not. Depending upon how it's resolved. But again, we are selling them subject to state law claims. All right.

Your Honor, with respect to walking away, because what I think we're really getting into, what's the function of the trailers, what's the function of the technology. That's the lion's share. But now I'd like to shift if I could, and talk about the 1.2 million. How do we get that? Well, Nevada has also codified breach of fiduciary duty.

I've cited the statute, NRS 78.138, and it says the fiduciary duties of directors and officers are to exercise their powers in good faith and with a view towards the interests of the corporation. And there's a follow up statute that Nevada has regarding shareholder distributions. And that is the basis of the breach of fiduciary claim. It prohibits the directors of a corporation from making a distribution to its shareholders if the corporation would not be able to pay its debts as they became due in the usual course of business.

This case was filed, I believe in July of 2020. In the statement of financial affairs, the income, the gross income of the debtor in 2019 was \$110,000. Yet in 2019, \$1.7 million of antecedent debt was collateralized and 1.2 million

2.2

2.3

2.4

in shareholder distributions was taken. That is the factual basis for the breach of fiduciary duty and the recovery of the 1.2 million. Thank goodness it's a lot less complex than the technology and the license.

As far as the difficulties to be encountered in collection of this, we do not have enough information, although I will concede Ms. Fletcher has provided some, but we don't have enough to make an informed decision about how much would be recovered from Dr. Seal if the adversary were to proceed, or how much he'd have when the adversary concluded. So we don't know. We perceive these as significant difficulties in the matter of collection. The complexity of the litigation is ultimately, Your Honor, an issue of fact. But the trustee believes that there would be expense and delay in determining these facts.

While we have findings on the record, I don't know if it's enough to support a summary judgment or not. There may have to be a trial, and this bankruptcy has been pending since 2020, and the adversary since 2021. It's time to move it along. It's time to move it to a close, not to go ahead and delay matters by trying a case where we do not what we would recover if we prevail in the end.

And we want to talk about the last interest, Judge which is the interest of the creditors. Again, this case was filed in July of 2020. July of 2021 is when the adversary was

filed. It's been a long and expensive process. It is the trustee's business judgment that the amounts bid today will maximize the returns for the creditors when the cost of ongoing litigation is weighed against an unknown recovery.

Your Honor, with respect to Jex, and the findings, and the exclusivity of the technology licensing agreement, if it's all the same to you, I do have it in my outline, but it's exactly what I have in my reply brief. May I just defer you to that rather than taking any more of the parties' time?

THE COURT: Certainly. And that doesn't preclude us from getting back into it if the need arises.

MR. LEHNERS: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But --

2.2

2.3

2.4

MR. LEHNERS: Again, in conclusion, the trustee is a neutral fiduciary. He and I have spent many, many hours dealing with the differential claim litigation and designing the basis for claims in the adversary as a result. We were guests in that claim litigation because trustees are required under 704(a)(5) to examine claims and, if a purpose would be served, to object to them. We watched the depositions, we watched the evidentiary hearing, and we made our decision, and that is of record. The trustee — I know that this is somewhat contentious litigation, but the trustee does not seek to favor one side over another. We are a neutral fiduciary duty — we are a neutral fiduciary. Obtaining maximum value is the goal

```
before my trustee and myself.
 1
              What the highest bidder does with the assets that are
 2
    purchased, that's the business of the highest bidder. If the
 3
    highest bidder wants to take certain positions with it or
    litigate certain things, it is free to do so. We lose control
 5
    over the asset once it's been sold. And any harm that befalls
 6
    the Seals is rooted in the prepetition activities, which are
 7
    part of the record. And the Seals have the right to avoid this
 8
    if they wish to submit an overbid. Your Honor, I want to thank
    you for listening to me, and can I answer any other questions
10
11
    before I sit down?
12
              THE COURT: Not at this time, thank you.
13
              MR. LEHNERS: Thank you, Your Honor.
14
              THE COURT: I -- let me retract that. How does the
15
    trustee proceed -- propose to proceed now?
16
              MR. LEHNERS: Well, Your Honor, may I confer with
17
    him?
18
              THE COURT:
                         Sure. Why -- I need to go off record for
19
    just a moment. My law clerk hasn't been able to join
20
    telephonically, so I would like to get law clerk on the line.
21
    So go ahead and confer while we do that.
2.2
         (Recess taken at 10:24 a.m.)
2.3
         (Proceedings resumed at 10:29 a.m.)
2.4
              THE COURT: All right. Thank you. We are back on
25
    record in Metal Recovery.
```

Mr. Lehners?

2.2

2.3

2.4

MR. LEHNERS: Yes. Thank you. Good morning, again, Your Honor. Mike Lehners, appearing on behalf of the Chapter 7 Trustee, who's also present. I have discussed the trustee's thoughts with him. I hope I've done an adequate job of explaining the apples and the oranges. It is the trustee's desire to proceed, if the Court is willing, with the auction now, in \$50,000 increments. The terms of the sale would be that defined in the asset term sheet. Again, that is Exhibit 2 to 255. And if anybody needs to confer with their clients or counsel, we should take a five-minute break before the beginning — the bidding begins. That is our wish.

THE COURT: Thank you. Let me survey the other participants. We've had, kind of, an opening statement as to the trustee's desire to sell the assets and essentially cover the compromise of the claims to the extent that various interested parties may ultimately be the purchaser. Who purchases what may effectively compromise one or more claims in one or more litigations. So I appreciate that.

I have read the materials, as I indicated, and I understand that much of this is discussed in the trustee's reply, and I am relying upon that. I need to open it up to the other participants, including Differential, as the objecting party, to see if there are objections to be raised or arguments to moving forward with the auction at all versus approving the

1 ultimate winning bidder at the auction. So any argument as to the trustee's ability to 2 conduct the impending auction I'm interested in hearing now, 3 please? Mr. Adams? 5 MR. ADAMS: Your Honor, Seth Adams, on behalf of Differential Engineering. Not to muck up the process, 6 7 especially given the amount of time that it has taken for all of us to get here, but that having been said, I think as the 8 discussion regarding the trailers just evidenced, when we are 10 discussing the sale of assets, I think it's a fairly important 11 thing to identify what we're actually selling. 12 THE COURT: It is, and it isn't. I mean, this is a 13 Chapter 7. And depending on your vantage, fortunately or 14 unfortunately, we don't have to be specific in the 15 determination of the existence of the asset. Especially, when, 16 you know, I think, Mr. Lehners and myself have tried to make it 17 abundantly clear, this is whatever it may be out there. Your 18 point, as I understood it from your brief in your opposition, 19 is depending on how this breaks, if GLA were to obtain it, 20 really you are concerned that it's going to result in 21 additional litigation. If Jex is the prevailing bidder, 2.2 though, is that the same concern? 2.3 MR. ADAMS: Perhaps not, although I wouldn't presume 2.4 for a minute that GLA wouldn't identify whether it had any 25 right to associate it, so --

THE COURT: Right.

2.2

2.3

2.4

MR. ADAMS: -- you know, whether that stops
litigation globally, I certainly could make that
representation. But as far as my clients are concerned, there
are certain preclusive effects of selling the Ninth Circuit
appeal. My client is not a litigant in that Ninth Circuit
appeal, but it's drastically affected -- if you're selling an
alter ego cause of action that's predicated off an order that's
subject to an active appeal.

You know, and likewise, as we've seen with the trailer, I think the other elephant in the room is the intellectual property. The most recent term sheet that was supplied by the trustee included all intellectual property rights. There is little to no identification, outside of the recently filed reply briefs, as to what the basis for the debtor would be to even have intellectual property to sell.

The trustee identified some things that were taken, arguably, out of context from this Court's ruling on the objections to claim. GLA, likewise, took findings from an arbitration proceeding, produced a couple of pleadings from that, and from this they are drawing that either MRS has a license, MRS has trade secrets, or potentially, Differential has patents -- I'm sorry, I said Differential; I meant Metal Recovery Services.

THE COURT: Metal Recovery.

2.2

2.3

2.4

MR. ADAMS: That there is something here to sell.

What I worry, right here and now, is just like all of the lead up with the noticing regarding the sale. Initial offer to Jex done on the morning of an adversary proceeding status hearing, to morph and use the same hearing, do a separate sale to GLA, with a separate and distinct term sheet identifying leases, identifying intellectual property. If we're rushing forward right now, not all bidders are going to understand what it is that their bidding, and we are chilling bidding.

THE COURT: Who else is out there to be -- Ms. Tirre,

I see you stand up there -- I'll take that as part of the

answer to my question. I'm aware that -- I appreciate the

appearance to signal that. That was helpful.

But you also have to be cognizant of the situation here. Under your opposition, there can only be a sale once the trustee exhausted all avenues of recourse, including all appeals of all eventual adversaries, to determine and ascertain the exact rights of all parties. And that's not how the world works.

My concern, and I guess phrasing different ways, the fact that the trustee has agreed, and has stated on record, that this is as-is, with no representations as to any existence or rights, you are buying the right to step into the shoes of Metal Recovery through the bankruptcy as a potential purchaser, whatever they may be. From what the trustee's telling me,

2.

2.2

2.3

2.4

that's the highest and best use of the estate at this time. To get where you need to be, you want to be, requires time, potentially a lot of time, and expense for a bankruptcy estate that you're not funding.

MR. ADAMS: Um-hum.

THE COURT: Right? So I understand your point.

Clarity is always preferable, but bankruptcy is comfortable with a lack of clarity. And that is what Mr. Lehners was talking about as to the trustee's business judgment. So at least, that is how I'm seeing the matter. I'm willing to hear any additional argument.

And it's not that you don't raise good points, but they all go to the lack of clarity. And as long as everybody understands that, as the baseline here, that's where we are. And if we are at a \$1.2 million bid, that seems to have the potential to greatly resolve a number of the outstanding issues that seems to support the trustee's business judgment as to officially administering this estate, which is really the trustee's sole concern.

The fact that it may launch additional litigation is beyond my understanding of the trustee's control of the estate, because he's liquidated that asset for the benefit of the estate's creditors. It doesn't solve your client's problems, but that's how -- I've listened to Mr. Lehners' discussion and reading -- keeping in context your opposition. So I don't mean

2.2

2.3

2.4

to preclude you from any argument; I just want to let you know what the Court was thinking.

MR. ADAMS: No, Your Honor. And certainly, I only want to raise my arguments right now as to going forward with the sale or not. We certainly have other points to address if the need arises. I think my concern, though, is, as I listen to the trustee describe his position and justification for the business judgment on the trailers, the business judgment and justification with respect to the litigation rights on the appeal, I heard a lot of discussion regarding efficiency and regarding moving things along, and yet, if we are just, frankly, kicking the can down, whether that's within this court or another court, I guess I'm not seeing the gains in efficiency. And whether the trustee directly is involved in all of that, I can't necessarily say. But it certainly seems like it's inevitable and we're just shifting the forum.

THE COURT: Again, it's who's can unfortunately, because you're tied to several cans. You know, the Seals may be tied to some GLA, depending on who would prevail, it alters that dynamic greatly, but it liquidates the assets of the estate, which is the trustee's job. His can probably comes off the board, so to speak, mixing metaphors and analogies. The trustee will then have the assets that the estate will have to make a distribution, which is the function of the estate.

So I see that, you know, despite the likelihood that

2.

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

2.3

2.4

25

some litigation or new disputes may arise, depending upon the sale of the trailers to whom, and the use of those trailers. Those -- that purchaser is coming into the sale with eyes open and clear that these are not clarified, defined rights. There are disputes attended to all of this. MR. ADAMS: I understand that, Your Honor. And that's -- I think that underpins one of my biggest concerns is that uncertainty naturally is going to drive down bidding. know, if I know for certain that I'm acquiring that chair, I'm going to bid accordingly, as opposed to the opportunity to receive that chair. So --THE COURT: Well, you know, again, in classic bankruptcy forum, Differential has the ability to bid and solve all of those problems, or the Seals may bid and solve all of those problems. And I don't know what the relationship between Differential, the Seals, and Jex may be. You know, and there's a potential path within this auction that that becomes an issue, you know, especially on a 363(m). So there's a lot in play and a classic bankruptcy forum, the more lack of clarity seems to have an inverse relationship with the discretion to the trustee seeking to find a way out in an expeditious manner that that provides a not insubstantial amount of money for the estate so --MR. ADAMS: I understand, Your Honor. I'm going to defer. I know that there are other parties, but thank you.

```
THE COURT: Ms. Tirre looks -- oh. A race to the
 1
 2
    podium who --
 3
              MS. TIRRE: I'm going to defer to Ms. Ostrow.
              THE COURT: Okay.
 4
 5
              MS. TIRRE: Thank you.
              MS. OSTROW: Thank you, Your Honor. And we're the
 6
 7
    successful bidders who up -- or not successful bidder, but the
 8
    highest offer, so I'll keep it brief. But I wanted to -- one
    important factor for Jex, as you're aware, is that we are the
10
    not -- the first -- or the exclusive licensee to the patents
11
    with Differential. That's our position. There's some
12
    difference with the trustee.
13
              But one thing I wanted to raise that was in our
14
    response to this Court is the trustee, in his reply, emphasized
15
    that there is a license that MRS holds to the patents. Your
16
    Honor --
17
              THE COURT: And again, I've cautioned, or subtly
18
    tried to caution, Mr. Lehners because words, I think, matter,
19
    and it is Mr. Lehners' position, on behalf of the trustee, that
20
    there is a license. I understand where he gets that from the
21
    adversary, but I don't think anything is as clear as Jex has
2.2
    the exclusive, exclusive, exclusive, versus Mr. Lehners, that
2.3
    MRS and the estate has a license. I understand those are the
2.4
    stakes that both parties are setting.
25
              MS. OSTROW: Yeah. And one of the issues I wanted to
```

raise, Your Honor, is that under 365(c)(1), and the Ninth 1 Circuit law, a license, without the consent of the -- either 2. exclusive licensee or the licensor, cannot be assigned. 3 that's --THE COURT: And my understanding -- we can clarify 5 with Mr. Lehners -- but I don't think he's trying to assign 6 7 without the consent of the licensee. I understand Mr. Lehners' point of view is that the estate disagrees that there is truly 8 an exclusive license to Jex exclusive of Metal Recoveries pre-10 existing the use of Jex Technology that has some existence. I 11 understand that it may be limited by, you know, by geography, 12 by what Mr. Lehners believes are certain limitations, such that 13 the trustee is the licensee and is willing to consent to that 14 assignment. 15 MS. OSTROW: Thank you, Your Honor. I think that's 16 the point I'm trying to clarify as well. Under the CFLC, Inc. 17 case which is at -- not citing a brief, Your Honor -- but 89 18 F.3d 673 from the Ninth Circuit, this is a quote from that 19 case, Your Honor. "It is well settled that a non-exclusive 20 license of a patent has only a personal, and not a property, 21 interest in patent and that their personal right of debtors 2.2 cannot be assigned unless the patent owner authorizes the 2.3 assignment or the license itself permits assignment." 2.4 So our position would simply be that's not part of 25 the -- the license is not part of the bundle of rights that's

```
before this Court, and that the debtor may sell it all, because
 1
    there's no consent.
 2
              THE COURT: I appreciate that and I'm glad you made
 3
    that statement. That goes into the quantum of whatever the
 4
    estate is selling and further adds definition as to the dispute
 5
 6
    that surrounds the technology.
 7
              MS. OSTROW: Thank you. And the other is just that
 8
    we do - -our position is that we would like a 363(f) as it
    comes to Jex, but we reserve all rights to any other bidders.
10
    And we do have responses to GLA's reply, but I believe that is
11
    not the time that you need to hear that. But I just wanted to
12
    bring up the license issue before --
13
              THE COURT: Well, it kind of is, and it isn't. It's
14
    a delicate balancing act at the moment. As to your 363(f),
15
    what is the lien of interest that is being sold free and clear
16
    of?
17
              MS. OSTROW: So the trailers would be -- we think
18
    that the trailers will be subject to the lease. But as the
19
    lessee under that lease, we would -- Jex would step into the
20
    sides of both, so that wouldn't be an issue if we are the
21
    successful bidder.
2.2
              THE COURT: That's as to Jex, correct?
2.3
              MS. OSTROW: Correct.
2.4
              THE COURT: So as to a non-Jex entity though, you
25
    believe that, not withstanding the breach of the rejection,
```

that that is still a interest in the trailers?

2.2

2.3

2.4

MS. OSTROW: Yes, Your Honor. And my basis for that, Your Honor, is that at the beginning of this case, when the trustee reached out, the trustee said we'd like you to continue to perform under the terms of this lease. We have provided that payment. We have provided over \$268,000 to the estate for operation of those trailers. Both trailers have not been operating at the same time. But since July of 2020, when this case was filed, we've continued in good faith with the trustee. We've kept the trailers in good operating condition. We've also made improvements to the trailers.

We understand, as well, that those trailers are currently in Chile, and it would be substantial fees to move them. And they are currently contracted at entity -- at mine sites to perform services, and we've been relying on them.

THE COURT: Thank you. You raise an interesting point that I had thought with Mr. Lehners but haven't raised. There are numerous representations of facts being presented here, such as Jex continued performance under the lease, the location of the trailers, which seem to be fairly important points. Mr. Lehners also detailed some matters primarily taken from the adversary decision of the court as entered in the BAP which is a little different.

But let's be clear for any record on further review. What am I to take of these? Is there any objection to

```
Ms. Ostrow's statements being accepted as a proffer for this
 1
    purpose, or do I need to take testimony, Counsel?
 2
 3
              Mr. Lehners, as to the statements regarding the
    trailers, the performance under the lease, and the location of
 4
    the trailers.
 5
              MR. LEHNERS: Thank you, Your Honor. It's my
 6
    understanding -- first of all, I did want to clear something up
 7
 8
    for the record, which is very important, as my trustee pointed
    out. When I said we're selling all the assets of the debtor --
10
              THE COURT: Exclusive cash. Yes.
11
              MR. LEHNERS: Well, Your Honor, the trustee has
12
    collected quite a bit of money. We did recover a preference.
13
    Jex has been making the payments. The assets the trustee has
14
    already collected will not be offered for sale. It is only the
15
    rights that are in the purchase --
16
              THE COURT: And I consider that to be exclusive of
    any cash that the estate holds wherever it may come from.
17
18
              MR. LEHNERS: And I also have the deepest respect for
19
    Ms. Ostrow's argument. Again, perhaps things were misread into
    my attempt to handicap what my prediction of the probability
20
    rights are. We are neutral. We are not trying to argue that
21
2.2
    the lease was, or was not, assumed. We acknowledge, and
2.3
    Mr. Burke can confirm, the payments have been made. And we ask
2.4
    Jex to make the payments to the estate, correct?
25
              MR. BURKE: Your Honor, Christopher Burke.
```

```
payments have been made up until a couple of months ago when we
 1
    started negotiating the full sale, so I've been lenient on that
 2.
 3
    pending the outcome of this.
              THE COURT: Makes sense.
 5
              MR. BURKE: But before that, the payments were made.
    Thank you.
 6
 7
              THE COURT: Understand.
              MR. LEHNERS: And anything that I've said that
 8
 9
    implies that the trailers can be sold free and clear of Jex's
10
    rights or the lease is not my intention. Again, it is to point
11
    out, as required by the medicine cabinet case, what the
12
    possibilities are. So everybody comes into this eyes wide
13
    open. And anything I said to take one position or another is
14
    simply nothing more than my attempt at an objective analysis.
15
              THE COURT: I appreciate that. As to the specifics,
16
    though, Mr. Lehners doesn't -- take it doesn't object to the
17
    consideration of Ms. Ostrow's statements as a proffer. Any
18
    objection from any other counsel?
19
              MR. OINES: Just --
20
              THE COURT: And Counsel, you can remain seated and at
21
    the mics. We're losing stuff in the flux in between, so thank
2.2
    you.
2.3
              Ms. Tirre, you'll eventually have to get to a mic,
2.4
    but -- go ahead.
25
              MR. OINES: Thank you. Ron Oines for creditor, Geo-
```

```
Logic Associates, Inc. Just a point of clarification, what
 1
    exactly is the proffer, and are we being asked to stipulate to
 2
    certain facts?
 3
              THE COURT: Well, specifically, the two matters that
 4
    the Court is most interested in is that Jex has continued to
 5
 6
    make the monthly payments as required under the lease --
 7
    prepetition lease agreement to the trustee, at the trustee's
 8
    request, including apparently, some payments to the state.
 9
    state being -- which state? There was --
10
              MS. OSTROW: I apologize. I don't understand.
11
              MR. LEHNERS: I think the word was estate.
12
              THE COURT: Estate. Okay. Thank you, sir.
1.3
              MS. OSTROW: Yeah. It was the estate, sir.
14
              THE COURT: That makes me it much clearer. So to the
15
    estate and the trustee's request, subject to the negotiations
16
    effectively trailing that off. And the second is that the
17
    trailers, the two trailers, are currently located in Chile.
18
              MR. BUBALA: Your Honor, Mr. Bubala, on behalf of
19
          It is not clear to us that Jex is in compliance with the
20
    terms of the lease, in terms of payments. There's a
21
    differential in payments when the trailers are in use.
2.2
              THE COURT: I don't need to be that specific for
2.3
    this. Just that there is some payments being --
2.4
              MR. BUBALA: Yes --
25
              THE COURT: -- made at the trustee's request.
```

2.2

2.3

2.4

MR. BUBALA: We will not require evidence that they have been making payments, but our acceptance of that proffer is limited to we're not in agreement that we don't know that it's the correct amount to be paid.

THE COURT: All right. All right, then. I think I sidetracked you, Ms. Ostrow, your statement. But that was an important point I wanted to clarify for the record. I'll let you continue and noted that, you know, you were indicating under the view of the law and the Ninth Circuit case that you cited that based upon even the trustee's parameters as stated that there is at least an argument to the contrary that the trustee, the estate, may not have any license to sell.

MS. OSTROW: Correct. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. OSTROW: And I'm happy to address some of the issues that were raised in GLA's reply regarding some of the additional intellectual property if this is now the time that the Court would like to hear that, specifically as to the trademark and the trade secrets. Or we can hold off on that depending on how you'd like.

THE COURT: And again, the Court's overriding premise is that all of this remains in dispute, and some of it hotly disputed. As to that, as between Jex and GLA, and even the estate and Differential. All of that establishes that at a bare minimum there are arguments and I believe that they are

2.

3

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

2.3

2.4

25

nonfrivolous arguments. I'm trying to be careful of the quantification of those arguments because, as Mr. Lehners says, I do not have to conduct a mini trial to sell this. I just know, and I know from the history of Metal Recoveries bankruptcy, there are numerous disputes and continuing arguments between all of the parties in interest which are largely present in the court here today. But as I indicated, I think ultimately that inures to the trustee's benefit in selling this and being absolutely clear that there are no representations as what being sold. So while there may be an argument that there is a license as to Jex Technology from the estate, it is well within the possibility that there is not. And that arena gets shifted out of the bankruptcy estate to whoever buys it to the extent that they may or may not want to pursue the validity of that license. So as to the other aspects of your technology, I think it falls within the same parameters unless there is something specific that we think that we need to address or if you believe that something is such a showstopper that this auction of whatever the estate may have cannot proceed.

MS. OSTROW: I think that the trademarks -- thank you, Your Honor -- and I think that the trademarks and these trade secrets that are alleged, as we know we dispute, but that would also fall under that Ninth Circuit precedent that I

2.

2.2

2.3

2.4

mentioned to you before. So to the extent there's a license that is just cut off and it is not authorized. And then any sale order, if it's not us -- I mean, if it's not Jex that's the successful bidder as to the patent exhaustion, that does not apply.

And we can -- there can be an evidentiary hearing about that. I understand the Court's parameters about potential disputes. But I wanted to note on the record that this body of patents, the trailers are one, specifically, one segment of how this entire heat bleaching process works. And so a patent exhaustion argument does not fit within this.

THE COURT: However, again, I appreciate that, and my knowledge of patent application law is exceedingly limited, and I default to the bankruptcy aspect. There's two pieces of personal property independent of anything else, stripped down, they have some value. They may not have the value with the attendant technology patents licenses that Jex currently has, but there has to be some value for them as trailers. And that's where all this gets complicated, obviously.

So again, I understand what you are saying, but I am not hearing that that is preclusive of the sale of the trailers as trailers.

MS. OSTROW: Correct.

THE COURT: Or the pickup. You know? Or whatever supplies may exist or whatever. They have a greater right,

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

2.3

2.4

25

obviously, and I assume that's why Jex has made an offer to purchase. But is there any reason that the auction cannot go forward having placed on record all the concerns about the legalities of the technology, the patents, and the licenses? MS. OSTROW: And our lease, Your Honor. I think that those are our main concerns, and we reserve, depending on who the successful bidder is, we reserve all objections to the sale and our participation doesn't waive those, Your Honor. THE COURT: I understand that, and I get that. But as lawyers, we always reserve. MS. OSTROW: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Right? But life goes on and having certain things happen will affect the playing field. I have no idea how this auction may proceed, or play out, so I can't tell you, but you do -- if GLA is the winning bidder, there cannot be an objection that GLA can't bid. It's what they have purchased, right? So to the extent that your reservation is to strike GLA, I mean, that's why I keep asking about the showstopper. MS. OSTROW: Right. No. And just for clarification, Your Honor, as you've gone through that. You said if GLA is the successful bidder, depending on what are in the terms, we still will have the opportunity to -- I'm not -- we're not tying to say GLA cannot participate in the bid, but we'd like to say that we have certain objections to what the terms are in

2.2

2.3

2.4

selling the assets to GLA. Is that -- we're reserved on doing so.

THE COURT: And that's the cart/horse situation, right? Because we may not know what was sold to GLA in that situation. It remains — the one thing that is clear is that whatever the estate has, except the cash that it has and has received from some administration to the date, will be sold. They get the bag, and we don't know what is in that bag. So to the extent that Jex then wants to say well, but GLA did not purchase the patent or the exhaustion argument or any of the technology, that's for another day, probably in a different court.

MS. OSTROW: Okay. And that would be something that we would ask, Your Honor, in the order as well, is an express preservation of those kicking it down the road in another — either before this court or another court, where we can still raise those issues, and a 363 sale order isn't going to prevent us from showing up in another court that interprets your order, and says I know how bankruptcy sales work, you no longer have a right to this.

THE COURT: Well, and that's why we've gone an hour and a half on these preliminaries is I am trying to make it abundantly clear that we are selling the bag, to continue that analogy, and without defining what may and may well not be, in that being sold. That all it is, whatever they have --

```
whatever they have to be determined later.
 1
 2
              MS. OSTROW: All right.
 3
              THE COURT: So. Ms. Tirre?
              MS. OSTROW: I think that's all we have. I'll just
 4
 5
    briefly make -- yeah. Please.
              THE COURT: Okay. Sure. Go ahead.
 6
 7
              MS. OSTROW: I think the only other clarification,
    and I might potentially seek this from Mr. Burke, Your Honor,
 8
    as well, that what's being sold is everything with the estate.
10
    So whatever the sale goes through here, the creditors that
11
    have -- you know, the trustee hasn't objected to, will receive
12
    the trickle down from admin claims and then unsecured debt, but
13
    this is everything the estate owns.
14
              MR. LEHNERS: Except for what's been collected so
15
    far.
16
              MS. OSTROW: Yeah. Aside from the cash.
17
              THE COURT: But what I believe what they're asking is
18
    that there are no other assets that the trustee is aware of
19
    administrating -- administering and whatever assets there may
20
    be, even if they are unknown presently and arise, they are
21
    being sold within the bag.
2.2
              MR. BURKE: Correct.
2.3
              THE COURT: All right.
2.4
              MS. OSTROW: Okay. And then we would just reserve
25
    rights as far as if the contracts are somehow found to have
```

```
been deemed waived and their argument regarding the 365(g) and
 1
    the waiver there, Your Honor, to assert any claims against the
 2.
    estate for having provided the $268,000. Thank you.
 3
              THE COURT: Thank you.
              MS. OSTROW: $268,000, Your Honor. And we have been
 5
    negotiating with other parties and entered into contracts down
 6
 7
    in Chile, so there might be additional reliance that we've
    relied upon in --
 8
 9
              THE COURT: I understand the reservation.
              MS. OSTROW: Thank you.
10
11
              THE COURT: Thank you. All right. One more time,
12
    Ms. Tirre.
13
              MS. TIRRE: Thank you, Your Honor. Amy Tirre, on
14
    behalf of Element Global Inc. through its agent, Empire Capital
15
    Management, LLC. Your Honor, my client retained me to appear
16
    today to bid on these assets. And it is -- a cash bidder
17
    understands that those are the terms.
18
              In reviewing the motion and the term sheet, we walk
19
    away with a different understanding than what has been
20
    discussed on the record here today. And the four issues I'll
21
    raise, I'll call them the four L's. I've got a license issue.
2.2
    I've got a lease issue. I've got a liabilities issue. And
2.3
    I've got a legal standard issue. So I'll take them --
2.4
              THE COURT: Well done.
25
              MS. TIRRE: -- in turn. Thank you.
```

THE COURT: The four L's. 1 MS. TIRRE: Four L's. 2 3 THE COURT: Okay. MS. TIRRE: So the first issue is this license and 4 whether or not it exists. And I understand from the Court's 5 comments, the Court wants to sell the bundle of sticks without 6 7 examining exactly what's in the bundle. However, from a third-8 party bidder's perspective, that is a problem when it comes to 9 the legal standard. Because I've heard the terms "as-is" 10 "where-is" bantered about, but we also have 363(f) free and 11 clear. So let's think this through. 12 If my client were to purchase what -- one of the 13 sticks is a license, if it exists, and then seeks to enforce 14 that license, it is no longer getting that free and clear, 15 which is my understanding was a term on the term sheet. There 16 would be a finding under 363(f) that the assets are being sold 17 free and clear. And now, it's acquiring a license subject to 18 claims by Differential and/or the Seals. So that is 19 problematic. 20 THE COURT: Well, let's just explore that a little 21 bit. What license does Elements Global think it's getting? 2.2 MS. TIRRE: Your Honor, it's waiting for the legal 2.3 ruling here today at this hearing because that is -- it's 2.4 asking me for that legal ruling. Is there a license; is there 25 not a license. And then --

THE COURT: There has been no legal ruling. 1 2 MS. TIRRE: Exactly. And I understand, and I was anticipating there would be. 3 THE COURT: There has been reference within the --4 Right. There has been testimony within the adversary claim 5 objection referencing the debtors' use of Jex Technology. What 6 that means is not going to be clarified today. 7 MS. TIRRE: And I think my client is anticipating 8 9 that it would be clarified today primarily because of 10 Ms. Ostrow's argument under 365(c)(1). 11 THE COURT: But that's not a 365 -- that's not a 12 363(f) issue. It either exists or it doesn't. It is not 13 subject to any interest, you know, or liens. It may or may not 14 exist under applicable law. 15 MS. TIRRE: Well, rights, claims, interests, liens. 16 Liens are bigger. You know, 363(f) is bigger than just liens, 17 Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: Certainly. I get that. That's why I 19 raised the issue of, you know, of the lease of the trailer as 20 well, right? I mean, your next L. 21 MS. TIRRE: I was going to get to that L. 22 THE COURT: Right? But I mean, it's the same issue. 2.3 There is -- there are issues attendant to that which parties, 2.4 depending upon which ones bid, which one buys, who's left out, 25 may dispute, may cause problems.

```
MS. TIRRE: And Your Honor, fundamentally, that
 1
    chills the bid.
 2
              THE COURT: Life chills bids. Right? I mean,
 3
 4
    uncertainty.
              MS. TIRRE: But it's the trustee's duty to maximize
 5
    the value of the assets. That's why we're here.
 6
 7
              THE COURT: But how does he maximize it? He
    maximizes it by going and filing a declaratory judgment to
 8
 9
    establish that. If your client's willing to fund that, maybe
10
    Mr. Burke will talk. But that is quintessentially the exercise
11
    of a Chapter 7's trustee's business judgment. It is cheaper
12
    and more efficient, and the estate will recover more, by
13
    selling what we have now without full knowledge than to file a
14
    declaratory action, retain Mr. Lehners on a hourly fee to
15
    litigate for two years plus with appeals to get your clarity.
16
    So here we are. I --
17
              MS. TIRRE: Fair enough. But that's -- my client's
18
    anticipating that we would walk away from the first part of
19
    this hearing with an understanding of is there a license, is
20
    there not a license, and we're not getting that ruling.
21
              THE COURT: I get that. That is not the function of
2.2
    the sale and compromise motion, unfortunately.
2.3
              MS. TIRRE: All right. Next point, with respect to
2.4
    the lease. The way the term sheet is structured, under I
25
    believe it's 1-D or purchased assets, Roman at 1-D, it refers
```

```
to a sale of the leases regardless of whether --
 1
 2
              MR. BUBALA: Your Honor, could you provide a page
    number?
 3
              THE COURT: Or ECF?
 4
              MS. TIRRE: Oh. I can.
 5
              MR. BUBALA: Or ask for a page number since I can't
 6
 7
    ask Ms. Tirre myself?
              MS. TIRRE: Oh certainly. No problem. It's page
 8
    26 -- I'm sorry, page 27 of 30. It's the Exhibit 2 to the
 9
10
    trustee's sale motion --
11
              THE COURT: To the motion.
12
              MS. TIRRE: -- which is docket 255-3, filed on
13
    February 23rd.
14
              THE COURT: All right. Before we get there, because
15
    I'm going to have to song and dance a little bit.
16
              I want to ask Mr. Lehners. I am looking at the term
    sheet attached to your omnibus reply. Is that modified from
17
18
    the sale motion?
19
              MR. LEHNERS: Your Honor, what I've attached as the
20
    exhibit to 255 at page 26, it references the buyer is Geo-
21
    Logics. And I will show this to Mr. Oines to make sure it is,
2.2
    in fact, the term sheet that he gave me.
2.3
              MR. OINES: Yes.
2.4
              MR. LEHNERS: Thank you, Mr. Oines. This is the term
25
    sheet submitted by GLA. It is attached as the second exhibit
```

```
1
    to 255 starting at page 26. I believe that's what Ms. Tirre is
    referencing?
 2
 3
              MS. TIRRE: It is.
 4
              MR. LEHNERS: Thank you.
 5
              THE COURT: All right.
              MR. LEHNERS: Any other questions, Your Honor?
 6
 7
              THE COURT: I want to clarify, that term sheet is the
    same term sheet that is attached as Exhibit 1 to the omnibus
 8
 9
    reply?
10
              MR. LEHNERS: I believe it is, Your Honor.
11
              THE COURT: Okay.
              MS. TIRRE: So with respect to my second L, the
12
13
    lease --
14
              MR. LEHNERS: Exhibit 2 to the omnibus reply, Your
15
    Honor.
16
              THE COURT: Exhibit 2?
17
              MR. LEHNERS: Yes. Jex's bid of February 2nd is
18
    Exhibit 1 to my omnibus reply.
19
              THE COURT: Okay.
20
              MR. LEHNERS: Exhibit 2 is the GLA bid.
21
              THE COURT: Just a moment.
2.2
         (Counsel confer)
2.3
              MS. TIRRE: But I think if I may just proceed on this
2.4
    one point --
25
              THE COURT: I'm sorry.
```

```
1
              MS. TIRRE: -- and maybe we can --
              THE COURT: We're not -- everybody's not at the same
 2
 3
    page yet, Ms. Tirre. I'm sorry. We're in a bad deposition
    situation here.
 5
              MS. TIRRE: Okay.
              MR. BUBALA: I apologize, Your Honor. Lou Bubala on
 6
    behalf of GLA. 255 is a sale motion. There's reference to
 7
    page 26. I don't know what that is. The purchase term sheet
 8
    is Exhibit 3 which starts on PDF page 35 and then 36 is the
    first page. So when somebody says page 26, I don't know what
10
11
    they're referring to. That is not our term sheet.
12
              THE COURT: Can I ask, to the extent possible, if you
13
    have an ECF designated document, refer to the page number in
14
    the blue ribbon up top?
15
              MR. LEHNERS: Your Honor, perhaps I can be of some
16
    assistance.
17
              THE COURT: Yeah. Mr. --
18
              MR. LEHNERS: The sale motion originally did contain
19
    three exhibits, then it was redacted. The redacted version,
20
    255-3, which is now 255 on the docket, contains only two
21
    exhibits. That's what I showed Mr. Oines. So if Mr. Bubala is
2.2
    looking at the sale motion with three exhibits, it is the
2.3
    unredacted motion. It should be the redacted motion.
2.4
              Does that help, Mr. Bubala?
25
              MR. BUBALA: Yes, it does. We're -- you just removed
```

```
an exhibit number and moved 3 up to 2 in your redacted version?
 1
    Yes. Okay. We're in agreement.
 2
              THE COURT: That gets Mr. Bubala to the right page.
 3
              MR. BUBALA: Yes.
 4
              THE COURT: It does not get the Court to the right
 5
    page since all I have is the unredacted. So what am I supposed
 6
    to be looking at?
 7
              MR. BUBALA: Your Honor, I believe that starts on
 8
 9
    page 36 of the unredacted original motion.
10
              THE COURT: Thank you.
11
              MR. BUBALA: Is the correct --
12
              THE COURT: Sorry about that.
13
              MR. BUBALA: -- asset and term sheet.
14
              THE COURT: I'm sure this will make for a much better
15
    transcript than it does for live. I am at the asset purchase
16
    agreement term sheet at page 36 of the unredacted. Thank you.
17
              MR. LEHNERS: It is also found on page 26 of the
18
    redacted one.
19
              THE COURT: 26 of the redacted. Of -- yes -- okay --
20
    thank you.
21
              Ms. Tirre, finally we are back to you. You may
2.2
    proceed.
2.3
              MS. TIRRE: Thank you, Your Honor. I only have in my
2.4
    possession the redacted version.
25
              THE COURT: Understand. That's the problem. Again,
```

```
apples and oranges seems to be the --
 1
 2
              MS. TIRRE: The theme.
 3
              THE COURT: -- phrase of the day.
              MS. TIRRE: The theme for today. So in reviewing
 4
    docket number 255-3, beginning on page 6, it's the asset
 5
    purchase agreement term sheet. And if we turn to the next
 6
    page, we're looking at the list of what the assets are that are
 7
 8
    being sold, and we get to D. And it describes contracts,
 9
    leases, agreements, et cetera. And then -- and it designates
10
    them as agreements -- and then it says, "regardless of whether
11
    such agreements are executory, have been rejected or deemed
12
    rejected within the meaning of Bankruptcy Code Section 365".
13
    So my -- and I'll wait.
14
              THE COURT: Yeah, I'm not --
15
              MS. TIRRE: Are you ready?
16
              THE COURT: No. It's not translating well.
17
              MS. TIRRE: I'm so sorry.
18
              THE COURT: Hold on, please.
19
              Mr. Bubala, did you find the number for the
20
    unredacted?
21
              MR. BUBALA: Yeah. So it's -- in the unredacted it's
2.2
    page -- PDF page 37. We have a large table at the top that's
2.3
    C, D, E. And she was talking about subsection D.
2.4
              THE COURT: Page 37 at 255?
25
              MR. BUBALA: Yes, page 37 of 40.
```

THE COURT: 37 of 40, D. All right. I am with you. 1 2 Thank you. MS. TIRRE: So Your Honor, in reviewing that term, my 3 understanding is that if my client were the prevailing bidder, 4 that it would, as the new owner of the trailers, it would be 5 receiving an assignment of the lease with Jex as the lessee 6 7 which includes this ongoing payment stream for the duration of the lease. So the lease in this instance becomes an asset 8 9 regardless of whether or not it's rejected, and the prevailing 10 bidder becomes the owner of the trailers subject to that lease. 11 Based upon what I heard Mr. Lehners and Ms. Ostrow state on the 12 record, it's my understanding that that's their intention as 13 well. And maybe -- my point is to clarify that if my client is 14 to bid. 15 THE COURT: Mr. Lehners, I think this is a point for 16 you. You can either stay at the table, so Ms. Tirre doesn't 17 have to keep going back and forth, or you can approach. 18 MR. LEHNERS: No problems, Your Honor. It is true 19 there is a lease. It is true that it may or may not be 20 executory. It is true the trustee has asked for, and Jex has 21 made payments, on that lease. Again, this has all been 2.2 disclosed. And D does mention executory agreements, contracts, 2.3 and whether or not the executory agreements have been rejected. 2.4 All I can tell Ms. Tirre, there's a lease, or it's a 25 contract, and it has been paid on. Its validity under state

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

2.3

2.4

25

law, its severability from the trailers, again, that would be the subject of a mini trial, and I cannot go that deep in my analysis. I can only explain the issues regarding what may affect this lease. I think the analogy of what you're buying is in the bag, and that's what we're selling. Does that help? MS. TIRRE: My question is, is there an assignment of the lease as part of the bundle of rights? MR. LEHNERS: To the extent that there is, we are assigning what we have. There is a document called a "lease". We would be including that in the sale. Yes. THE COURT: Subject to the bankruptcy and what has and has not happened. That's -- you know, you're picking up Mr. Adams' point that there is a lack of clarity. MS. TIRRE: There's a lack of clarity that results in chilling of the bid. And I do think it's substantial, Your Honor, because my client's prepared to bid. But I'm not certain I will be returning to bid after I have a chance to confer with him about what's occurred this morning. anyway, we'll proceed. THE COURT: Yep. MS. TIRRE: With respect to the two remaining L's, we've covered one, which is this question of the legal standard. And that is are we dealing with as-is/where-is or are we dealing with free and clear? To me, they are distinct with respect to, depending on the type of asset, let's say,

that's being sold.

2.2

2.3

2.4

THE COURT: It goes as to what is against versus the existence of the asset. We are not selling free of clear of disputes. That is not an interest that is being -- you cannot say I have a contract, no I don't. You sell it through the bankruptcy and there -- it does away with questions of consideration and consent. That isn't how that works.

To the extent that there is a lien, I have not heard anything to suggest that there is. To the extent that, you know, there is some -- there's no real property changing hands so there's no, you know, other interest against that.

But there is a fair question as to, you know, as you've said, the nature of the lease. As to one group of parties, they may well want to continue it and recognize it as a lease. As to another, they may want to recognize that it was rejected and that has some, you know, meaning for them.

MS. TIRRE: Welp, Your Honor, I can just say, it matters, depending on what we're looking at, in terms of a tangible versus an intangible asset. So the lease, personally, I can understand where my client stands, and that's clear enough for me. The license, very unclear because if there is a license, whether it exists, that answer — that question is not being answered this morning.

And then if the buyer intends to assert and enforce a license, then, what you're essentially telling me is, that

```
license is not free and clear because it's as-is/where-is,
 1
    subject to all other claims and disputes.
 2
              THE COURT: Well, then yeah, I think we might be just
 3
    circling the track here, but it is not free and clear of
 4
    disputes that it's an unenforceable license.
 5
              MS. TIRRE: Understood.
 6
 7
              THE COURT: Yeah.
              MS. TIRRE: I'm just --
 8
 9
              THE COURT: I understand.
              MS. TIRRE: -- I'm making the record clear, Your
10
11
    Honor, for myself --
12
              THE COURT: And same.
13
              MS. TIRRE: -- and for my client. So when my client
14
    gets the opportunity to review the transcript, if there's any
15
    question.
16
              THE COURT: I understand.
17
              MS. TIRRE: And then, my fourth L relates to
18
    liabilities. So we have spent a lot of time analyzing -- or,
19
    not we -- I'll just say Mr. Lehners, for the record, the Court,
20
    we've been discussing the various claims that the trustee has
21
    asserted in the various litigations and that those are claims
2.2
    that would then be sold to a third party. Or they may be
2.3
    compromised if they're transferred to GLA. That's clear
2.4
    enough.
25
              What I want to make a record about is with respect to
```

2.2

2.3

2.4

liabilities that the estate may have because this term sheet that I have been looking at and relying upon states that the sale is free and clear -- or the buyer is not assuming any liabilities. And so given the status of the various pending litigations, I want to make very clear that, for example, if the buyer, my client, is the successful bidder and takes on the claims that the estate holds as assets, including the claims asserted in the adversary proceeding, which include alter ego, fraudulent transfer, and I understand, brief of fiduciary duty. And those claims that are asserted in the adversary, I believe, are also sort of assume -- subsume the claims that GLA brought in its pending federal case against the debtor itself as well as the Seals and I believe Diversified [sic].

Because once a bankruptcy case is filed, if a creditor has brought alter ego and fraudulent transfer claims, I believe the trustee steps into the shoes and has -- is the only party that can assert those claims for the benefit of all creditors versus that sole loan creditor being able to continue with that ongoing, you know, court -- state court or federal court litigation outside of the bankruptcy court.

So I just want to make a record that, to the extent that my client is the prevailing bidder, my client is getting an assignment of claims. But to the extent that the estate, the debtor, the trustee, is defending any litigation, the prevailing bidder is not stepping into the shoes and assuming

```
any liabilities with respect to any pending litigation.
 1
              THE COURT: And my sense is you probably need to talk
 2
    to Mr. Lehners about that. And I don't want to speak for him
 3
    or the trustee.
              So we're at about 11:20. My sense is we should go
 5
    ahead and continue these discussions -- the preliminaries --
 6
 7
    and then break, let people talk, and then come in, you know,
 8
    after lunch and see where we proceed to auction. All right?
 9
    That'll give you an opportunity to discuss with Mr. Lehners and
10
    Mr. Burke and if there's anything that we need to address on
11
    the record, then -- preliminary to the actual auction itself --
12
    we can do that then.
13
              MS. TIRRE: Okay, Your Honor. I just point out just
14
    to make final point on this is on the very same page you were
15
    just on, which I believe is now 37 of 40, with your unredacted
16
    version of the motion --
17
              THE COURT: It is.
              MS. TIRRE: -- the statement that I'm referring to is
18
19
    there toward the bottom of that page in the table. It says
20
    explicitly, "buyer will not assume any liabilities of the
21
    sellers or the estate."
2.2
              THE COURT: What subsection is that?
2.3
              MS. TIRRE: Your Honor, the table is broken up where
2.4
    it has the subparts C, D, and E. And then just below E --
25
              THE COURT: Right.
```

MS. TIRRE: -- is the sentence I'm referring to. 1 2 THE COURT: Thank you. Thank you very much, Ms. Tirre. 3 MS. TIRRE: Thank you. 4 THE COURT: Might as well go ahead, Mr. Lehners. 5 MR. LEHNERS: Your Honor, I'm sorry. I will be as 6 7 fast -- very fast. I have four comments. Number one, you mentioned this is not a sale free and clear of disputes. 8 9 Ms. Tirre did talk about liens, claims, and so on. And I wish 10 to make the following clarifications. 11 A lien is a claim against property that is security 12 for a debt. We know of none since Differential's security, or 13 claim, has been extinguished. A lease is the right to use 14 property that may include a purchase option. That does exist 15 and it's been discussed. The claims against the debtor are by 16 GLA, the law firm, and Mr. Fuller's office. There is no 17 security interest claim by any of those creditors in the assets 18 being sold. Not under Article 9, not under any statutory lien 19 that I am aware of or the trustee is aware of. 20 So the claims against the debtor, to the best of my 21 knowledge, are not secured by estate property because the only 2.2 secured claims we saw were asserted by Differential 2.3 Engineering. And even if there were some secret lien out 2.4 there, a security interest, it would not be perfected as 25 there's no UCC-1. And as the trustee is selling his strong arm

```
powers under Section 544 and Section 545, they would be able to
 1
    avoid such secret liens.
 2
              And last, I can appreciate the luxury of certainty,
 3
    but this is a Chapter 7 trustee; that is something he cannot
 4
    give. What he can give is his best description and analysis,
 5
    which we have done. So I thought it important to make the lien
 6
 7
    liability angle crystal clear, because I'm not aware of any
    liens attaching to the specific assets or claims being sold.
 8
 9
              THE COURT: All right. There is a potential
10
    distinction between selling free and clear of liens and selling
11
    free and clear of liens and interests. Is this sale free and
12
    clear of just liens or free and clear of liens and interests?
13
              MR. LEHNERS: Your Honor, the sale is free and clear
14
    of liens, but it is not free and clear of disputes. Where an
    interest falls between the lien and dispute, I don't think I
15
16
    can answer that right now.
17
              THE COURT: All right.
                                           Mr. Bubala?
18
              MR. BUBALA: Whenever Mr. Lehners is done, I'd like
19
    t.o --
20
              MR. LEHNERS: I'm done.
21
              MR. BUBALA: Okay.
2.2
              MR. LEHNERS: I said I'd be quick.
2.3
              MR. BUBALA: Your Honor, I'll try to provide -- Louis
2.4
    Bubala on behalf of GLA. I'll try to provide a little clarity.
25
    Look, subsection 1-D that we've been discussing about all
```

1 contracts, leases, agreements, it is as specific as it can be.

2 And to the extent that the conflicts with 365(f), we're

3 essentially waiving any protection under 365(f). We are taking

4 subject to leases. That is what that provision says.

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

2.3

2.4

25

I don't know what other parties want to do in terms of their bids, but our bid includes taking it subject to the lease. Maybe I should have stood up and said that at 9:30, but here we are.

A second point of clarification, you kick it down the road later or not, I don't know what Elements or Empire is other than mysteriously filed a request for special notice and a notice of appearance. They're a complete foreign unknown entity. To the best we can tell, they are traded on pink sheets at below a penny a share. We don't believe they have any financial viability, and we will not accept a proffer from Ms. Tirre about their viability. We don't believe that they should be entitled to participate in any bidding today.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BUBALA: We don't believe this is a factor in chilling of this action at all. We have, as Mr. Lehners has said, at least three parties already that have put bids forward. We are nearing -- we're prepared to take an auction here. The concept of chilling does not arise in this case with bids at this value.

THE COURT: Understand. I take the point.

```
Mr. Lehners, I think I'm coming back to you.
 1
              So does anyone else wish to weigh in any as we are
 2
    approaching the close of the preliminaries at least it feels?
 3
              MR. LEHNERS: Your Honor, I believe I've stated
 4
    everything that's relevant on the record, but may I talk to my
 5
 6
    client very briefly?
 7
              THE COURT: Well, let me -- again, I have a sense,
    and subject to discussing with you and other counsel, my sense
 8
    is we should kind of conclude this preliminary part, let people
10
    go get lunch. I have a sense that there may be some
11
    discussions that should happen or will happen or need to
12
    happen. I don't know. But come back at 1.
13
              MR. LEHNERS: Sure.
14
              THE COURT: And then we can see what, you know, we
15
    need to do. But the anticipation is that we would move to the
16
    auction. I see Ms. Ostrow has some --
17
              MS. OSTROW: Thank you, Your Honor. And we will talk
    to Mr. Burke. So one -- two items. First, our offer is free
18
19
    and clear of claims and liens and interests based on the
    current offer, but we'll discuss that offline, Your Honor.
20
21
              THE COURT: Right. And that's kind of purchase we're
2.2
    discussing because --
2.3
              MS. OSTROW: Right.
2.4
              THE COURT: -- you are the interest.
25
              MS. OSTROW: Yes.
```

```
THE COURT: So it's kind of easy.
 1
              MS. OSTROW: Yeah. Just to make sure. We don't know
 2
    if there's additional claims that someone could bring for
 3
    prepetition conduct.
 4
 5
              THE COURT: Right.
              MS. OSTROW: And then, I have an emergency hearing at
 6
 7
    one o'clock, Your Honor.
 8
              THE COURT: Okay.
 9
              MS. OSTROW: So I was just hoping if I could have --
10
    maybe if we could come back at 1:20 or so that would be --
11
              THE COURT: Sure. Not a problem for me.
                                                        I'll let
12
    you -- I've got plenty of stuff I can deal with so -- but I
13
    think it's important that everyone talk, probably get some
14
    food. And then -
15
              Ms. Tirre? We need to get you a mic.
16
              MS. TIRRE: Yeah. In light of Mr. Bubala's
17
    objection, Your Honor, at this moment I don't know if my client
18
    will be bidding or not when we return. However, if my client
19
    wishes to bid, then I need some instruction or guidance as to
20
    what will be required to overcome Mr. Bubala's objection. I
21
    have requested from my client a document to show its financial
2.2
    wherewithal to bid. I have requested that. I'm hoping I will
2.3
    have that in my possession. If I do, I will come to court with
2.4
         I'm hoping that will be sufficient.
25
              THE COURT: You also should be prepared to --
```

```
Mr. Lehners, what is the term for closing?
 1
              MR. LEHNERS: Your Honor, it is payable all cash five
 2
    days after entry of a non-appealable order.
 3
              THE COURT: And you've sought waiver of -- well,
 4
    okay, so it won't affect the --
 5
              MS. TIRRE: The 14 day --
 6
 7
              THE COURT: 14 days.
              MR. LEHNERS: (Indiscernible -- 11:30:08) waiver of
 8
    6,000.
 9
10
              THE COURT: Okay. So yeah, you'll have to figure out
11
    and present something as to being able to close within 14 days.
12
              MR. BUBALA: Your Honor, for clarification with
13
    everyone else, we are willing to pay tomorrow, notwithstanding
14
    any order.
15
              THE COURT: And that's what I think you have to talk
16
    to Mr. Burke about in the next two hours.
17
              MR. BUBALA: Right. I just wanted to make sure
18
    Ms. Tirre's client understood that we're not going to delay for
19
    five days.
20
              THE COURT: Yeah.
21
              MR. BUBALA: Our offer will be payment immediately.
2.2
              THE COURT: And Mr. Lehners, I'll expect you to
2.3
    translate all of these discussions in the next two hours as to
2.4
    any modification of the terms.
25
              MR. LEHNERS: Yes, Your Honor.
```

```
THE COURT: Because if the terms -- we have the
 1
           If there's a modification, we'll take it in the
 2
    standard of what is the best and highest offer. All right?
 3
    So --
 5
              MS. TIRRE: Thank you.
              THE COURT: All right.
 6
                                       Mr. Adams, I see you
 7
    patiently standing in the back so --
                          Thank you, Your Honor. I hope that my
 8
              MR. ADAMS:
 9
    question is very simple. Seth Adams on behalf of Differential.
10
    Ms. Tirre highlighted that aforementioned sentence, I quess,
11
    buyer will not assume any liabilities to the seller to the
12
    estate, and there was some discussion as to whether we were
13
    referring solely to liabilities and/or claims. In the context
14
    of potential disputes regarding the purchaser's ability to
15
    utilize a license, intellectual property, I want to make sure
16
    that that is something that is not being compromised.
17
              In other words, if I am to read claims into this
18
    sentence, if a purchaser buys and that purchaser is utilizing
19
    something that my client believes to be violative of their
20
    intellectual property, I do not want this phrase being
21
    transposed into something that would preclude my client from
2.2
    pursuing those rights that you talked about were being
2.3
    preserved this morning.
2.4
              THE COURT: I get it. I appreciate you putting it on
25
    the record. And at 1:30 we'll see what happens.
```

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

2.3

2.4

25

MR. ADAMS: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Okay. So I'm going to let you talk because I think that there's some things to talk about. Yeah. Again, first of all, I'm glad we set this on for an in-person. I think this is one of the better uses of inperson I've seen over the past recent term. As I told -- or had a conversation with Ms. Ostrow, I do not hear anything, other than potentially Mr. Adams' comments that the sale should not go forward. And as indicated by my running commentary, I believe the trustee has demonstrated a sound business judgment for the auction going forward. I think the discussion that we've had demonstrates that all of the, you know, problems or warts on the assets demonstrates that this sale is an expedient, efficient, and from the bids on the record to date and a advantageous administration of the estate. So subject to anything that may come up contra at 1:30, when we convene. It is the Court's intention to proceed with the sale, and we'll discuss the exact terms when we reconvene. But we'll let the parties go. We'll be adjourned until 1:30. Off record, please. Thank you. MR. BUBALA: Your Honor, will you keep the courtroom open for us so we can use this as a meeting space? THE COURT: That depends on Mr. Lehner's graces. So yes, sir.

1 MR. BUBALA: Thank you. THE CLERK: Please rise. 2 3 (Recess taken at 11:33 a.m.) (Proceedings resumed at 1:38 p.m.) 4 THE COURT: We are back on the record in the Metal 5 6 Recovery main case and Burke v. Metal Recovery Solutions 7 adversaries. Mr. Lehners, why don't you go ahead and just advise 8 9 me where we believe we're at. 10 MR. LEHNERS: Your Honor, we -- I spoke to the 11 parties and I think it's come time to basically set up bidding 12 procedures. Of concern is the application of 363(f). That was 13 discussed a lot. And I think it would be better if the parties 14 gave you their thoughts on how it's going to apply here, given 15 the items that we are selling. 16 And you can also discuss the bidding increments. 17 Ms. Tirre will be acting on behalf of her bidder, and I just 18 think we need to set those parameters up before we go ahead 19 with the auction, and I think it's best you hear it from the 20 individual parties. 21 THE COURT: All right. Certainly. Let me go ahead 2.2 and state my baseline. My understanding is that the current 2.3 offer being proposed is from JEX at 1.2 million, subject to the 2.4 term sheet that is either Page 26 or 37, depending upon what 25 you're looking at, on the ECF, and all the terms stated there.

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

2.3

2.4

25

Let me see if I can get to that. Anyway, while I'm bringing that up, we'll use that as the baseline -- as the baseline for our discussion. I was hoping things reset when we left, so bear with me for a minute. We're going to talk -- allow you to talk through it while I'm pulling up the documents actually -- be able to talk intelligently --MS. OSTROW: Thank you, Your Honor. And thank you for the time, too, earlier. One thing that we talked about with Mr. Lehners and Mr. Burke is that this is -- our offer is conditioned on a 363(f) finding, and we reserve all rights to -- if we are not the successful bidder, to object to the successful bidder the trustee selects otherwise. But our offer is expressly conditioned on that finding from the Court, Your Honor, and that can be found in the term sheet both as to the Court approval, a requirement that the Court find that there's -- 363(f) finding, an also that the sale order include that finding. THE COURT: I am almost to the point where I can pull up documents. So, before we really get into the weeds on this too much, let me take that time to get them. Can you give me the ECF number? MS. OSTROW: Yes. And I think it might be easier for the record if we refer to the -- what the Court initially did was the omnibus reply, which is at Docket 305 --

1 THE COURT: Okay. 2 MS. OSTROW: -- because I think everyone has the same 3 page numbers that way. THE COURT: If everybody else is, I can get to that. 4 So I am at ECF 305. 5 MS. OSTROW: Yes. And I am at Page 33 of --6 7 THE COURT: 48, hopefully? MS. OSTROW: Yes. 48. 8 Thank you. 9 THE COURT: All right. And a chart with a bunch of 10 bullet points. 11 MS. OSTROW: Yes. And that bullet point says, "All 12 purchased assets shall be purchased free and clear of all 13 claims, including, without limitation, successor liability 14 claims, liens, and encumbrances, pursuant to Section 363(b) and 15 Subsection 5 of the bankruptcy code." 16 And the next section, Your Honor, at the very bottom 17 of the page, it says, "The trustee will motion to approve the 18 sale pursuant to Section 363(f) of the bankruptcy code, and 19 seek such similar relief." 20 THE COURT: All right. There's a nuance there. I 21 don't dispute anything that you say, but lawyers are lawyers, 2.2 right? And to the extent that some -- the buyer steps in, does 2.3 something, that is not successor liability or anything free and 2.4 clear of, that's incident of the ownership of the asset, that 25 is not what we're talking about under 363(b) and (f), correct?

```
MS. OSTROW: I think that's my understanding. So if
 1
    I could give just an example. So, for example, the -- if we
 2
    step in as the owner of the trailers, we're technically each
 3
    side of the lease. We're not going to be assuming we can
 4
 5
    assume --
              THE COURT: Right.
 6
 7
              MS. OSTROW: -- the lease and it would be fine, but
    there would be no -- any sort of prepetition claims that were
 8
 9
    against, you know, some sort of breach of a contract or
10
    something. That's stuck with the estate. No one could pursue
11
    us for use of the trailers.
12
              To the extent that -- because -- it's more
13
    complicated if there are other buyers with us with JEX, because
14
    we contend we have the exclusive license, a lot of those
15
    disputes go away.
16
              THE COURT: Right.
17
              MS. OSTROW: But we understand that if -- let's say
18
    GLA is the successful bidder, that if they buy the assets,
19
    there would still be an issue of a license dispute down the
20
    road.
21
              THE COURT: And that's when we will have a much more
2.2
    detailed --
2.3
              MS. OSTROW: Robust --
2.4
              THE COURT: -- discussion of what that is. And quite
25
    honestly, it may not be after the bid. It may be trying to
```

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

2.3

2.4

25

figure out which is the best and highest offer. But again, things get complicated even as the nominal lessee right now, anything prepetition or anything presale that JEX did with the trailer as the lessee -- again, I can imagine a situation where there's a claim against both JEX and Metal Recovery, even post-petition, because of the ownership of it, that that's not really being released here, certainly not as to JEX, right? Anything that JEX does -- just because it has an incident to the trailer, just to be clear, I never know how far to go out on a tree of "what ifs," but I think your point is, to the extent that it is a prepetition claim against Metal Recovery, that's against the estate. Nothing is being transferred, as I understand it. I'll ask Mr. Lehners to confirm that in a moment, but I think that's all well and cooked into this right now. think that's not a problem. Why don't we go ahead and have Mr. Lehners knock that out before we get too far afield. MS. OSTROW: Thank you. MR. LEHNERS: Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you, Ms. Ostrow. Your Honor, as I had mentioned before, what we are selling is the claims that we have. With respect to claims against the estate and with respect to 363(f), there are some issues. We have reviewed the schedules and statements filed by Metal Recovery Solutions signed under penalty of perjury.

2.

2.2

2.3

2.4

did disclose to and only to Article 9 security interests, and those were in favor of Differential Engineering, and those have been dealt with.

Given the concerns of the bidders here today, I would request, if the Court is willing, and Dr. Seal is willing, to simply have him make a brief statement under oath that there are no other security interests executed in favor of any other party or liens against assets of the estate, secured claims, liens.

THE COURT: I'm not sure what that accomplishes.

Right? Because all we're concerned about, quite honestly, is perfected liens.

MR. LEHNERS: Right.

THE COURT: Right? So, to the extent that there's a secret lien out there, presumably, the bankruptcy code washes that out. The time has come for, you know, unsecured claims, so that really should probably not be an issue. But if there's a perfected lien out there, there's a perfected lien, and it rides through the bankruptcy — has there been a UCC search? If it's in Chile, does it matter? I mean, I'm not sure how you would perfect security interests against trailers that are now in Chile.

MR. LEHNERS: Your Honor, we did rely upon the schedules and clearly we can perform a UCC-1 search and have -
THE COURT: But there's no reason to believe that

```
that -- what you're telling me is there's no reason to believe,
 1
 2.
    as you stand here today, that that's going to indicate
 3
    anything.
              MR. LEHNERS: No. I think Dr. Seal was 100 percent
    honest when he filled out his schedules. I haven't found any
 5
    misrepresentations --
 6
 7
              THE COURT: Well, and nobody's come in the two years
 8
    and said, hey, those are our trailers either.
 9
              MR. LEHNERS: Exactly. However, given the concern
10
    that Ms. Ostrow voiced, it's a thought that went through my
11
    mind that at least something should be put on the record for
12
    assurances that there are no perfected liens or security
13
    interests out there. Unperfected liens, unperfected security
14
    interests can be dealt with under the trustee's powers that are
15
    being assigned. That's not an issue. But it's the ones that
16
    are of record. And I do think that that should probably be
17
    addressed with respect to the --
18
              THE COURT: I'm not opposed to that, but I'm not sure
19
    what it's going to give you in addition to the statement of --
20
    the statements, the --
21
              MR. LEHNERS: The schedules.
2.2
              THE COURT: Right. So you've got one sworn statement
2.3
    against another then, and adding two sworn statements doesn't
2.4
    make it any more true or false.
25
              MR. LEHNERS: Understood.
```

2

3

5

6

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

2.3

2.4

25

```
THE COURT: So, you know, the only other thing that
would be done would be a UCC, and you're telling me that in
reasoned business judgment not necessary because the debtor has
sworn to it under penalty of perjury --
         MR. LEHNERS: Uh-huh.
         THE COURT: -- and there's been no indicia in the
past two years that anybody's got -- other than Differential,
of course.
         MR. LEHNERS: That's what we are relying on.
However, given the concern shown by the parties, it was an
issue I thought I should tell the Court.
         THE COURT: If the bidders believe that that is
material to it, then, you know, I'm happy to hear them and we
can undertake this. But if not, then I think we've got what
we've got, and putting Mr. Seal -- Dr. Seal under testimony
isn't really going to change that.
         MR. LEHNERS: Understood, Your Honor. Thank you for
hearing --
         THE COURT: Ms. Ostrow, you can nod yes or no. You
don't need it? No. And Mr. Bubala is saying he doesn't.
         Ms. Tirre, are you concerned? All right.
         All right. So that issue is what it is.
         MR. LEHNERS: Right. Can I answer anything else for
you, sir?
         THE COURT: I'm not sure if Ms. Ostrow was done or
```

```
not.
 1
              Did you have any other -- we interrupted you, so I
 2
    want to make sure that you have a full chance to --
 3
              MS. OSTROW: Oh, no, no. Thank you. I
 4
    appreciate it. I just -- and I think that -- I appreciate
 5
    Mr. Lehners addressing the concern, and I think that the Court
 6
    understands that the parties have not always gotten along, and
 7
    so it's more of an issue about claims and other -- less about
 8
 9
    liens, more about general claims, hopefully, and also
10
    protecting the fact that we don't believe the debtor owns
11
    certain things --
12
              THE COURT: Right.
13
              MS. OSTROW: -- and patent exhaustion argument
14
    preserved --
15
              THE COURT: I think we're -- you know, we're getting
16
    to that point where we just need to see who the bidder is to
17
    see what that means towards the sale.
18
              MS. OSTROW: Thank you, Your Honor.
19
              THE COURT: All right. Certainly.
20
              UNIDENTIFIED: (Indiscernible).
21
              UNIDENTIFIED: My question will probably refer to Ms.
2.2
    Ostrow, so that's why I'm doing a little hand motion.
2.3
    was a reference to a 3 -- was it a 363(f) finding or a 365(f)?
2.4
              MS. OSTROW: Oh, I apologize. I may have said 365.
25
    I meant 363, Your Honor. 363(f).
```

```
THE COURT: You want the free and clear.
 1
 2
              MS. OSTROW: Yes, Your Honor.
 3
              THE COURT: Yes.
              UNIDENTIFIED: Okay. All right. I just needed to
 4
    clarify that because I was reading 365 and --
 5
 6
              THE COURT: Okay.
 7
              UNIDENTIFIED: -- I was thinking what? All right.
 8
    Thank you.
 9
              THE COURT: All right. Mr. Bubala, anything before
    we go into the terms specifically?
10
11
              MR. BUBALA: No, Your Honor.
12
              THE COURT: Ms. Tirre.
13
              MS. TIRRE: Your Honor, I spoke with the trustee and
14
    his counsel, and I had the chance to get my client
15
    representative on the phone. I believe my client has satisfied
16
    the trustee's concerns or if there -- there weren't any. It
17
    was raised by GLA's counsel. But my client is prepared to go
18
    forward and bid today.
19
              THE COURT: Okay. Good.
20
              MS. TIRRE: And I'd just make a record. There were
21
    no bidding procedures in the order. There's no
2.2
    prequalification requirements. There's no proof of fund
2.3
    requirement. No other bidder here has had to satisfy that, so
2.4
    I would ask, to the extent the GLA still raises its objection,
25
    it be overruled with respect to my client. Thank you.
```

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2.3

2.4

25

```
THE COURT: All right. So I think that's a natural
seque as to who are the bidders in the room. We obviously have
      I'm assuming from GLA's participation that GLA is
participating. And based upon Ms. Tirre's comments, I'm
assuming that her client is participating, as well.
         MS. TIRRE: Your Honor, may I speak further to that?
Ms. Ostrow just made a record with respect to the terms and
conditions for her client, and including a 363(f) finding --
         THE COURT: 363(f), yes.
         MS. TIRRE: Yeah, finding. And my client is going to
require the same finding in the Court's order with respect to
its -- if it is the prevailing bidder. Because this is, again,
back to the term sheet my client was relying upon, it's in the
term sheet.
         THE COURT: That's fine --
         MS. TIRRE: Thank you.
         THE COURT: -- except --
         MS. TIRRE: Yes.
          THE COURT: -- the meaning of "free and clear." One
is going to be much different from JEX versus your client, as I
understand, right?
         MS. TIRRE: Understood. With respect to JEX, that's
not an issue for my client, because I understand that it
asserts certain rights and has certain objections with respect
to both the license and/or the lease --
```

```
1
              THE COURT: Okay.
              MS. TIRRE: -- depending on who the bidder is. And
 2
    I'm not concerned about that for my client.
 3
              THE COURT: All right. And that's an important
 4
    statement to --
 5
              MS. TIRRE: Understood.
 6
 7
              THE COURT: -- get on the record, I think. I think
 8
    that largely clears that path.
 9
              So, Mr. Lehners, any comments? I mean -- or concerns
10
    from the trustee as to that?
11
              MR. LEHNERS: Not at this time, Your Honor.
12
              THE COURT: All right. So, to the extent sale is
13
    free and clear, free and clear of liens with any interest to
14
    attach in the order and priority that they existed pre, there
15
    are no known existing liens to attach, that is really an
16
    abundance of caution as to free and clear of interest. It
17
    sounds like there's an agreement that the motion which provided
18
    that the sale be free and clear is free and clear of interest,
19
    although the parties are all aware of JEX's -- JEX
20
    Technologies' position regarding its technology, patents,
21
    licenses, which is not being sold free and clear of.
                                                          That is
2.2
    determined by federal laws, the patents and the trademarks, and
2.3
    the other applicable state law as to its interest pursuant to
2.4
    its preexisting agreements for the use of the trailers, the
25
    technology, and such. All right. That is one term. That is
```

```
taken care of. Agreed?
 1
 2
              MR. LEHNERS: Yes, Your Honor.
 3
              THE COURT: All right. Mr. Bubala?
 4
              MR. BUBALA: Yes, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: Mr. Oines?
 5
              MR. OINES: Yes.
 6
 7
              THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Tirre?
 8
              MS. TIRRE: Yes, Your Honor.
 9
              THE COURT: All right. Ms. Ostrow, I should also
10
    just come back to you. Is that acceptable as to the Court's
11
    representation of that term?
12
              MS. OSTROW: Could you repeat that, please,
    Your Honor?
13
14
              THE COURT: No, I don't think I can. I can summarize
15
    it, though. It's just that free and clear of liens, that's the
16
    easy one. No one believes there's any liens. It will be free
17
    and clear with liens to attach in order and priority that they
18
    may exist. None are believed to exist, pursuant to the Court's
19
    ruling on Differential claim objections.
20
              Free and clear is also as to interest except your
21
    client's interest in the technology, the lease, the patents,
2.2
    all we've been talking about, it's not being sold free and
2.3
    clear of. That is to be determined under the applicable law.
2.4
              MS. OSTROW: I appreciate that, Your Honor.
25
              THE COURT: All right. So free and clear, as we have
```

```
discussed, what other terms and conditions are -- do we need
 1
 2
    Mr. Adams, go ahead.
              MR. ADAMS: Thank you, Your Honor. I think mine
 3
    might be --
 4
              THE COURT: I think you need to come up. I'm sorry.
 5
    That's the problem.
 6
 7
              MR. ADAMS: Not a problem. Sorry.
 8
              THE COURT: Get your steps in.
              MR. ADAMS: Seth Adams on behalf of Differential
 9
10
    Engineering. I would hope that Differential could dovetail,
11
    although the interests are completely distinct from those
12
    asserted, that we simply don't have -- we haven't lost by
13
    virtue of a sale free and clear the right to have
14
    determinations of the ownership of intellectual property.
15
              Again, today there's no -- not going to be any
16
    definitive ruling as to what is being sold. JEX is obviously
17
    wanting to maintain all of its rights. I would certainly ask
18
    that Differential be able to do the same.
19
              THE COURT: I don't think that is a problem, but I'm
20
    not sure what lien or interest -- I mean, the lien we
21
    understand. That's claim objection. That's through the
2.2
    adversary and the BAP appeal. That would be free and clear
2.3
    of --
2.4
              MR. ADAMS: Uh-huh.
25
              THE COURT: Right. I mean, subject to distribution,
```

```
which is really the ultimate end goal there for Differential.
 1
    As to any interest, I'm trying to make it fairly clear-cut
 2
    between ownership. That is not an interest to be sold free and
 3
    clear of, right? And that's what Mr. Lehners has repeatedly
    said. All that's being sold is all that they own.
 5
              MR. ADAMS: Okay.
 6
 7
              THE COURT: So, if there is not an ownership, they
    cannot own it. They cannot sell it. I think that answers the
 8
 9
    question.
10
              MR. ADAMS: And I think we've put that on the record.
11
    I can't imagine incorporating it into an order would
12
    necessarily --
13
              THE COURT: Right.
14
              MR. ADAMS: -- be possible, but I appreciate that,
15
    Your Honor.
16
              THE COURT: All right.
17
              MR. ADAMS: Thank you.
18
              THE COURT: I have a sense, Mr. Bubala, I should come
19
    back to you as to additional terms or -- or do I need to go to
20
    either Ms. Ostrow or Mr. --
21
              MR. BUBALA: Your Honor, we put the terms forward
    that were filed with Mr. Lehners' motion. We --
2.2
2.3
              THE COURT: I'll keep inching this along then.
2.4
    50,000 increments is --
25
              MR. BUBALA: Fair enough.
```

```
1
              THE COURT: -- acceptable? All right.
              Ms. Tirre, 50,000 increments?
 2
 3
              MS. TIRRE: Yes, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: And Ms. Ostrow. All right. 50,000
 4
    increments.
 5
              All right. Closing? It was said to be 14 -- well,
 6
 7
    effectively 14 days after the Court's order. Is there any
 8
    change in the term of closing?
 9
              MR. LEHNERS: Your Honor, just a term of
10
    clarification. And it basically says that payment is due
11
    within five business days of the bankruptcy court entering a
12
    final non-appealable order approving the agreement. I would
13
    like some clarification of what "non-appealable" means in this
14
    context.
15
              THE COURT: I know what it means legally, but I'm not
16
    sure that that's what the parties mean.
17
              MR. LEHNERS: In other words, what I'm getting at is
18
    we have 14 days to appeal an order after entry on the docket.
19
    In the event Day 15 comes and there is no appeal, then it's a
20
    non-appealable order. If it is, however, appealed, we have
21
    asked for a 363(m) finding, and there would be a stay required.
2.2
    At that point in time, the stay, I would presume, would require
2.3
    a bond, probably equal to or greater than the amount of the
2.4
    bid, so the estate and the creditors would be protected.
25
    That's all I was getting at.
```

```
1
              THE COURT: Okay.
              MR. LEHNERS: As opposed to the order's entered,
 2
    automatically is paid, and then there's an appeal later on.
                                                                  So
 3
    I believe under the term sheet -- and parties are free to pay
    early if they wish. We would love that. But I just wanted to
 5
 6
    clarify, the way I read it, non-appealable means no appeal
    filed within the 14 days. And if one is filed, we default to
 7
    363(m).
 8
 9
              THE COURT: All right. So let me -- where is -- is
10
    the closing requirement -- do you happen to have --
11
              MR. LEHNERS: Yes, Your Honor. I am looking at 255.
12
    It is Page 26, purchase price, 1,150,000 in cash. And then in
13
    the bullet point below that, you will find that language.
14
    Page 26.
15
              THE COURT: So I'm looking, unfortunately, at one
16
    that's been typed over.
17
              MR. LEHNERS: Is it ECF 255?
18
              THE COURT: I'm on the reply.
19
              MR. LEHNERS: Oh, I can get that --
20
              THE COURT: No, no, no. I'll find it.
21
              UNIDENTIFIED: I have it.
2.2
              MR. LEHNERS: Your Honor, Page -- also 26 of the
2.3
    reply, would be Exhibit 2.
2.4
              THE COURT: I've got "Sale Order" as the header on
25
    the far left of the columns. "Court approval." "Court
```

```
approval" is the last --
 1
              MR. BURKE: Your Honor, may Mr. Lehners approach --
 2
 3
              MR. LEHNERS: May I approach?
              MR. BURKE: -- and give you his copy?
 4
              THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Burke. All right. 255-3
 5
    at Page 26. Within five days of the business -- business days
 6
    of the bankruptcy court entering a final non-appeal -- so
 7
    really we're talking about 19 days then?
 8
              MR. LEHNERS: Yes. Yes, Your Honor. If there's no
 9
10
    appeal. And if there is an appeal --
11
              THE COURT: If there's no appeal.
12
              MR. LEHNERS: -- we deal with 363(m). That's --
13
              THE COURT: Okay. So the Court interprets this five
14
    days after becomes non-appealable. And if there is an appeal,
15
    then there's issues -- that will play out.
16
              MR. LEHNERS: Yes, Your Honor. We'll play those out
17
    then.
18
              THE COURT: All right. Does everyone agree with the
19
    term for closing? Mr. Bubala, it sounds like it's taken from
20
    your document, so --
21
              MR. BUBALA: Which was taken from JEX's document
2.2
    originally.
2.3
              THE COURT: Okay.
2.4
              MR. BUBALA: Your Honor, we would modify our bid so
25
    we would close within two days.
```

```
THE COURT: All right. That's when we get into --
 1
 2
              MR. BUBALA: Two days --
 3
              THE COURT: That will be your counter-offer.
 4
              MR. BUBALA: Yes.
 5
              THE COURT: All right. Ms. Ostrow, you're the
    current -- current bidder on the board, so I assume there's no
 6
 7
    problem with the closing date.
 8
              MS. OSTROW: That's correct, Your Honor.
 9
              THE COURT: All right. And Ms. Tirre.
10
              MS. TIRRE: I'm just clarifying. Right now --
11
              THE COURT: Mic. We should have just had a handheld
12
    so you'd get --
13
              MS. TIRRE: Thank you. So, just clarifying, it's 19
14
    days, correct?
15
              THE COURT: Hopefully, knock on wood. Right? I
16
    mean, the earliest it would be was the 14-day period, five days
17
    after, it's 19. If something happens, then blah blah blah, and
18
    it's whenever the Court enters the order, of course, so --
19
              MS. TIRRE: And we're all pragmatists, but --
20
              THE COURT: Yes.
21
              MS. TIRRE: -- my client's understanding is that it
2.2
    could possibly be shorter than that, and that's fine, too, but
2.3
    I just --
2.4
              THE COURT: Okay.
25
              MS. TIRRE: -- wanted to understand what the timing
```

```
is that's currently before the Court.
 1
              THE COURT: And I think that from -- Mr. Bubala is
 2
    indicating that that will be a term --
 3
              MS. TIRRE: Thank you.
              THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Tirre.
 5
              All right. What other terms are there that we need
 6
 7
    to clarify before we go into auction?
 8
              MR. LEHNERS: Your Honor, I guess, could I ask for a
 9
    clarification? The term sheet has a waiver of the 14-day stay
10
    under 6004(h) --
11
              THE COURT: Uh-huh.
12
              MR. LEHNERS: -- as to the effectiveness. We're
13
    applying a different rule under 8000 or something for the
14
    appealable time period.
15
              THE COURT: Yeah. You're not waiving -- I don't
16
    think you can get everybody here to waive the time for the
17
    appeal. And since it's triggered on the appeal, the
18
    effectiveness is immaterial to the performance of the purchase
19
    price.
20
              MR. LEHNERS: Okay.
21
              THE COURT: But I mean you're right. I did see that
2.2
    there -- were waiving the -- I mean the 6004(h), but that
2.3
    becomes meaningless because it's tied to the appellate period.
2.4
              MR. LEHNERS: Unless we close.
25
              THE COURT: Unless you make an offer that has to be
```

```
accepted or met.
 1
 2
              MR. LEHNERS: Okay.
 3
              THE COURT: Anything else that we need to discuss?
              All right then. We're agreed that we are now into
 4
    the auction, correct? Hearing no objection, the offer
 5
    currently before the Court on the terms that we have just
 6
 7
    discussed is by JEX Technology at 1.2 million cash. Are there
    any bids in excess -- and we're starting from the beginning at
 8
    50,000. Correct, Mr. Lehners?
10
              MR. LEHNERS: We have 1.2 million outstanding, and
11
    the bidding increments -- the bidding increments are 50,000.
12
              THE COURT: All right. So any bids at 1,250,000?
13
              MR. BUBALA: Yes.
14
              THE COURT: All right. GLA bids 1.25. And that's
15
    the counter-bid then, Mr. Bubala?
16
              MR. BUBALA: Yes, Your Honor.
17
              THE COURT: All right. Then, on the terms and
18
    conditions we have previously stated, any bid at 1,300,000?
19
              JEX bids 1,300,000. Feel free to jump -- we don't
20
    have to go 50,000 if that was improvident. It may take us an
21
    hour to get through.
2.2
              So 1.3 million is the bid from JEX. Any bid at a
2.3
    higher -- higher offer?
2.4
              MR. BUBALA: GLA, 1.35.
25
              THE COURT: 1.35. 1.4? All right. And Elements
```

```
1
    Global bids 1.4.
 2
              1.45?
 3
              MR. BUBALA: 1.45, GLA.
 4
              THE COURT: 1.45, GLA.
 5
              1.5? 1.5 from JEX.
 6
              1.55?
 7
              MR. BUBALA: GLA.
 8
              THE COURT: 1.55 from GLA.
              1.6? 1,600,000? From GL -- from JEX. Sorry.
 9
10
              1.65 million?
11
              MR. BUBALA: GLA.
12
              THE COURT: GLA is at 1.65.
13
              1.7 million? 1.7 million from JEX.
14
              1.75?
15
              MR. BUBALA: GLA.
16
              THE COURT: GLA. 1.8 million? Elements Global?
17
              1.85 million?
              MR. BUBALA: GLA.
18
19
              THE COURT: GLA at 1.85.
20
              1.9 million? 1.9 million from JEX.
21
              1.95?
22
              MR. BUBALA: GLA.
23
              THE COURT: 1.95 from GLA.
2.4
              2 million? 2 million from JEX.
              2,050,000?
25
```

```
1
              MR. BUBALA: GLA.
              THE COURT: GLA.
 2
 3
              2,100,000?
 4
              UNIDENTIFIED: Sorry. Where -- what is the increment
 5
    right now?
              THE COURT: We're moving to 2.1 million. Elements?
 6
 7
              Move to 2,150,000.
              MR. BUBALA: GLA.
 8
 9
              THE COURT: GLA at 2,150,000.
10
              2.2 million? JEX.
11
              2,250,000?
12
              MR. BUBALA: GLA.
13
              THE COURT: GLA at 2.25.
14
              2.3 million? 2.3 from JEX.
15
              2.35?
16
              MR. BUBALA: GLA.
17
              THE COURT: GLA at 2.35 brings us to 2.4 million.
18
              UNIDENTIFIED: 2.4?
19
              THE COURT: 2.4. Yes. Sorry. Elements?
20
              2.45? The current bid is 2.4 million. The needed
21
    bid to continue is at 2.45.
22
              MS. OSTROW: Your Honor, can we take a recess?
2.3
              THE COURT: Pardon me?
2.4
              MS. OSTROW: Can we take a recess, just for five
25
    minutes (indiscernible) recess?
```

```
THE COURT: Recess? We'll be in recess for about
 1
 2
    five minutes.
              MS. OSTROW: Thank you.
 3
              THE COURT: Let the in-court know that we are off
 4
    record.
 5
              THE CLERK: Please rise.
 6
 7
         (Recess taken at 2:12 p.m.)
 8
         (Proceedings resumed at 2:33 p.m.)
 9
              THE COURT: We are back on record in the Metal
10
    Recovery Solutions main case and the associated adversary Burke
11
    v. Metal Recovery Solutions, et al.
12
              All right. When we took our break, the present bid
13
    was 2.4 million by Ms. Tirre's client, Elements Global. And
14
    the next bid would be 2.45. Is there a bid at 2.45 million?
15
              MS. OSTROW: Yes, Your Honor. There is a bid at
16
    2.45. I want to clarify for the record this is a joint bid
17
    between JEX and Dr. Seal. That would be 2.3 million from JEX
18
    Technology and -- I'm not very good at math -- .15 --
19
              THE COURT: 150,000.
20
              MS. OSTROW: Thank you. From Dr. Seal. That's
21
    embarrassing. But -- and we've discussed this with the
2.2
    trustee, and I think the trustee is amenable to the acceptance
2.3
    of the joint bid.
2.4
              MR. BURKE: Yes, Your Honor. That's correct.
25
              THE COURT: All right. Thank you. So we'll
```

```
accept -- the Court accepts the bid of 2.45 million combined
1
    from JEX and Dr. Seal.
 2
              MS. OSTROW: Thank you, Your Honor.
 3
              THE COURT: That brings us to 2.5 million. A bid at
 4
    2.5 from Elements.
 5
              2.55? Any bid at 2.55 million?
 6
 7
              There is no bid from JEX. I'm seeing no bid from
         I'm not going to do "going once, twice." All right.
 8
    That concludes the bidding. The winning bid is 2.5 million
10
    from Elements Global.
11
              Mr. Lehners, are you requesting a backup bid?
12
              MR. LEHNERS: I am, Your Honor. I would like the
13
    backup bid of 2,450,000, the joint bid by JEX and Dr. Seal, to
14
    be the backup bid.
15
              THE COURT: Unless there's any objection, the Court
16
    will find that the backup bid submitted by JEX with Dr. Seal at
    2.45 million -- $2,450,000 is the backup bid.
17
18
              All right. Now we know who the winning bidder is.
19
    What additional matters do we need to discuss, if any?
20
              MR. LEHNERS: Your Honor, the one issue that I have
21
    is that since Elements -- we have no claims against Elements at
2.2
    all, none. They're a stranger to the case. I don't believe --
2.3
              THE COURT: I don't know that.
2.4
              MR. LEHNERS: Okay. That's fine then. Then I'll
25
    just stand on the 9019 analysis that I have done.
```

```
1
              THE COURT: But the trustee is requesting a 363(m)
 2
    designation, correct?
 3
              MR. LEHNERS: Correct.
              THE COURT: All right. I will need some testimony,
 4
    Ms. Tirre, to establish the good faith, because I have no idea
 5
 6
    who Elements Global is. So is your client available by remote?
 7
    Client representative?
 8
              MS. TIRRE: He is in an airport right now.
 9
              THE COURT: All right.
              MS. TIRRE: So it's -- just for the record, it's
10
11
    Element Global, Inc.
12
              THE COURT: Okay. And there's a long string after
13
    that, as well?
                    I --
14
                         No. It's -- there's an authorized agent.
              MS. TIRRE:
15
    It's called Empire Capital Management, LLC. With respect to a
16
    good faith finding for the prevailing bidder, Your Honor, if we
17
    could just have a break, I'll contact him. I understood he was
18
    walking through airport security as I was last speaking with
19
    him.
20
              THE COURT: The other alternative, if he's going to
21
    be someplace tomorrow morning, I have a 9:30 and an 11.
2.2
    I'm here. So if you want to actually have a set time where he
2.3
    won't be public, I just need -- need you to put him on there
2.4
    and go through whether there's any association to the -- you
25
    know, the bankruptcy debtor, the principals or -- and allow any
```

```
for cross-examination is there is a concern.
 1
              MS. TIRRE: Okay. Yes, Your Honor. For the record,
 2
    I did forward the definition of "insider" to Mr. David
 3
    Richards, who is the principal of Empire Capital Management,
    LLC. I asked him to verify that neither Empire Capital
 5
    Management, LLC nor Element Global, Inc. has any party
 6
    affiliated with it that could be deemed an insider under
 7
    Section 101 -- I think subpart 31 of the code, and I have an
 8
    email to that effect in my possession.
10
              But with respect to putting on evidence, if I could
11
    have a break, I'll contact Mr. -- the person who I have been
12
    conferring with is Steve Gagnon, G-A-G-N-O-N, and he is the CEO
13
    of Element Global, Inc. I have to confer with him to see if he
14
    has availability tomorrow.
15
              And may I ask just for the Court's indulgence. I
16
    happen to have a doctor's appointment at 10 a.m. tomorrow.
                                                                 Ιt
17
    happens to be in the neighborhood here. So if it could be
18
    11:30, I think I could be here.
19
              THE COURT: I can accommodate that.
20
              MS. TIRRE: Okay. Thank you.
21
              THE COURT: Certainly. So let's go off record one
2.2
    more time, let Ms. Tirre coordinate with her client, and then
2.3
    we will see what else we need to address by way of closing this
2.4
    matter up. All right. Off record.
25
         (Recess taken at 2:40 p.m.)
```

```
(Proceedings resumed at 2:51 p.m.)
 1
              THE COURT: All right. We're back on record in Metal
 2
    Recovery Solutions and the associated adversary v. Metal
 3
    Recovery Solutions et al. Ms. Tirre?
 4
              MS. TIRRE: Thank you, Your Honor. Amy Tirre on
 5
    behalf of Element Global, Inc. I conferred with Mr. Steve
 6
    Gagnon. He will be available tomorrow at 11:30 a.m. Pacific
 7
    time for a telephonic appearance --
 8
 9
              THE COURT: Sure.
              MS. TIRRE: -- to testify regarding the good faith of
10
11
    the buyer. And I just want to make clear, he is the CEO of a
12
    publicly traded entity, and therefore, the sole subject matter
13
    of tomorrow's hearing is the good faith finding and lack of
14
    insider status.
15
              THE COURT: It -- it's the good faith finding. Yes.
16
              MS. TIRRE: Okay.
17
              THE COURT: That's all. But given everything that's
18
    happened in this case, I think it's best to cross the T and dot
19
    the I.
20
              MS. TIRRE: Right, Your Honor. I just -- my only
21
    concern is we're not opening the door to a big evidentiary
2.2
    hearing about the financial status of Element Global, Inc.
2.3
              THE COURT: We will see where it takes us.
2.4
    understand the concern. I -- I'll be here and listening.
25
    as a logistical matter, I'll be here, "here here." So --
```

```
MS. TIRRE: I will be "here here" too.
 1
 2
              THE COURT: Okay. I was going to say, if you want to
    come, any other parties that that want to come are welcome to
 3
    participate. Since it'll be telephonic, it can be
 4
    telephonically or in person. And then --
 5
              MS. TIRRE: Your Honor, as I stated, I'll be --
 6
 7
              THE COURT: Okay.
              MS. TIRRE: -- in the area of -- physically of the
 8
 9
    courthouse.
              THE COURT: Right.
10
11
              MS. TIRRE: I will come to the courtroom tomorrow.
12
    Thank you.
13
              THE COURT: Okay.
14
              MS. TIRRE: My client will -- representative will be
15
    on the phone.
16
              THE COURT: Of course. All right. Mr. Lehners, any
    other matters that we need to clarify or address before we
17
18
    conclude the auction?
19
              MR. LEHNERS: Your Honor, no, not that I can think
20
    of. Everything was set forth very well. I did take notes
21
    regarding what 363(f)(5) means, that Jex's rights are
2.2
    preserved; that the other claims would attach to the proceeds
2.3
    in order of priority; and we're selling exactly what we own.
2.4
              I have also offered to circulate the proposed order
25
    of course, to Ms. Tirre as well as Ms. Ostrow and Mr. Bubala
```

```
and Mr. Oines if they wish to see it, so everybody can chime
 1
 2
    in, and we can make it as thoroughly -- as thorough as
 3
    possible.
              And I want to thank you for listening to us today. I
 4
 5
    know it was long.
              THE COURT: It's my job.
 6
 7
              MR. LEHNERS: And it was going down a lot of rabbit
    holes, but I think we got a good result today for the
 8
 9
    creditors. Thank you, Your Honor.
10
              THE COURT: All right. I still need to make my
    findings, but I want to allow the people who are getting up in
11
12
    the gallery to make their statements before I conclude with my
13
    findings.
14
                           Thank you, Your Honor. Just one
              MS. OSTROW:
15
    question on scheduling for tomorrow. Is there availability for
16
    a Zoom appearance as well, or will it only be telephonic? And
    I don't want to throw it too many wrenches in.
17
18
              THE COURT: We can accommodate a Zoom video.
19
              THE CLERK: I could create a Zoom meeting --
20
              THE COURT: Yeah, if you would, go ahead.
21
              THE CLERK: -- by video.
22
              THE COURT: I assume you want to participate by
2.3
    video?
2.4
              MS. OSTROW: Yes, Your Honor. I have a flight this
25
    evening and an infant at home, so she's technically a toddler
```

```
Then one other thing that Mr. Lehners did say, we would
 1
    like to look at the final order and be able to comment before
 2
    the Court enters that, so thank you.
 3
              THE COURT: Certainly. Ms. Fletcher?
 4
              MS. FLETCHER: Hi. Elizabeth Fletcher on behalf of
 5
    Dr. Seal. I'd like to ask if we could also look at the order
 6
 7
    since we participated in the bidding, and we had an opposition
 8
    in.
 9
              THE COURT: I do not have a problem with you looking
10
    at it.
11
              MS. FLETCHER: Great. Thank you.
12
              MR. LEHNERS: No objection for the record.
13
              THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Lehners.
14
              All right. We have spent a considerable amount of
15
    time going through the predicate for the sale, the terms of the
16
    sale, and then ultimately concluding the sale. There was some
17
    question at the beginning of this morning as to what
18
    transaction would actually ultimately be presented. As I
19
    understand it and reading between the lines from Ms. Tirre's
20
    comments about her client being, as advised to the Court, a
21
    third party, this is not a compromise. This is a sale.
2.2
              The transfer of the assets is not in conclusion of
2.3
    litigation. This comment may be subject, quite honestly
2.4
    until -- with tomorrow's testimony to confirm that, but as of
25
    this moment, the Court is interpreting this to be a sale under
```

2.

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

2.3

2.4

25

363, rather than compromise under 9019. Recognizing given the other parties in interest that if either GLA or really Jex had been the prevailing bidder, then they -- that would cast a different light as to the aspects of the pending lawsuits and claims asserted by the trustee as how they would proceed. With that said, until the sale actually closes, there is some necessity to at least recognize the compromise component of it, given that Jex is a backup bidder at \$2,450,000. Regardless of which vehicle is used and the standards to be applied, again, I am struck by over -overriding sense that the discussion today demonstrates the best interests and -- of either a sale or the compromise of this bundle of assets, which is obviously subject to considerable dispute amongst the parties as to what the estate actually holds, be it the tangible property inherent in the two trailers. While the estate owns the two trailers, their use and the value of those entities depends upon the ability either to maintain the lease between the estate and Jex, or use the trailers for individual purposes presumably with Jex technology. The question of any entities other than Jex's ability to use the Hydro-Jex technology is a very disputed, contentious point. However and again, mysterious, I'm walking through this; I may be interested in developing this tomorrow as to the intent of the purchaser, but the representation was made by

2.

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

2.3

2.4

25

Ms. Tirre going through the terms and conditions, and I understood it, that Elements was intending to enforce the lease as the lease, and therefore, it obviates some of the concerns about the use of the technology as -- if that is the case, . Jex will continue to possess the trailers with a option to purchase and has all the rights under its license with Differential as to the use of the Jex technology. That is a good result for the estate. It helps alleviate burdens on the estate as to the determination of the exact rights as to the usage of the trailers. And quite honestly, the concerns regarding the technology, and I am speaking fairly informally there, as to the patents, trademarks, IT, and all of those concerns that were referenced during the course of this hearing. That comes at a big benefit, not the least of which is the significant increase in the purchase price as well. The auction served its function to maximize the purchase price. There was a considerable amount of discussion about chilling with the lack of clarity as to what the estate actually owned and its ability to convey items. But again, the actions speak louder than the words and a robust auction was held. The fact that a -- it appears a third party was able to participate and ultimately prevail, suggests that this was far from chilled. Does seem that there is a very limited market. The parties that have essentially necessitated the bankruptcy

2.

2.2

2.3

2.4

filing were obviously the primary parties in interest and participated vigorously. But the fact that the third party was able to take advantage of a continuance, appear, bid, participate meaningfully, I think reflects that there was sufficient time, deference to the concerns to allow the estate to ascertain the realities of the sale and keep it moving forward. And this case, with its history of which I am well acquainted and well aware and take into full account, needs to continue to move forward. The trustee has done so.

The sale/compromise is a wholly appropriate mechanism. To the extent that it's a sale is clearly supported by the sound business judgment. It was submitted to an auction for which three entities participated through several rounds. I have agreed on the terms. I think it has been a, you know, a excellent example of the use of an auction to maximize the estate with unknown — with assets that are unknown in their ownership and the extent of rights, faced with a difficult and costly, timely path to ascertaining those rights, while maximizing a return for the estate.

As to the claims, we have what appears to be a third party purchasing those claims. The claims are subject to continuing dispute. There have been some ancillary developments within the claim objection for which certain facts were adduced, relied upon in a claim objection that may well be used in any further claims litigation within particularly the

2.

2.2

2.3

2.4

trustee's adversary. That's all well and good, but the point is, is that there is some knowledge and development of those facts by the trustee or through GLA in the claim objection.

So there is some establishment of the universe of the factual predicate supporting the claims brought by the trustee. They have not been litigated to conclusion. There are no pending motions that I'm aware of in that adversary, but they are — they constitute claims of the estate, and they are capable of being sold. No party has objected to the sale of those claims. The discussion regarding those claims for purposes of compromise also serves to support the sale of those claims as part of this aggregated bundle that the estate owns.

At the commencement of this morning, I did ask

Mr. Lehners if there was some valuation of the separate

components being transacted today. We never really got to

that. But there was a reference to the Open Medicine case from

the BAP and I think, related to that, what's clear in this

situation is that oftentimes in bankruptcies that the sum is

worth way more than the individual parts, and is the Court's

considered understanding and finding, that that is exactly the

case here today. I don't know if it's possible to break down

the components to assign specific valuations, but altogether

the components of the tangible property in relationship to the

lease, in relationship to the causes of action, and the claims,

had significant value as demonstrated through the auction.

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

2.3

2.4

25

So I do not believe that it's necessary to really develop any more discussion than the trustee has submitted within the reply, in particular, and Mr. Lehners' presentation at the commencement of this proceeding. But while I do not opine or offer any decision as to what was said there, I think those points in that discussion are all valid as a preliminary statement of the trustee's claims and quite honestly, the concerns. I think it also establishes while you know, it's easy enough to say that litigation is costly and time consuming and uncertain, all that's true. The Court's involvement in this case for an extended period of time, including the totality of the claim objections and the filing of the trustee's lawsuit, leaves the Court with a firm and definite conviction that the sale of these claims, while substantial claims, is supported by the economic benefit that the estate has received by bundling it with the sale of whatever assets it has as to the hard assets in the trailer, the lease with Jex, and any other personal property that goes along with it. So short answer, saying I do not believe that the estate could recover the same total amount by segregating the hard assets and the causes of action to the point that the sum is greater than the individual components here. So the Court does find that the sale is in the best interest of the estate, that there is a reasoned, articulated, and supported decision by the trustee to proceed with the sale and/or compromise.

2.2

2.3

2.4

Turns out that the Court believes that as constituted to Elements Global, Inc., that it is a sale and not a compromise, but even if something were to happen to the winning bid of the \$2.5 million such that the backup bid to Jex and Dr. Seal at \$2.5 -- -45 million would be the winning bid, the Court would find alternately that the elements of (a) and (c) have been met.

There are questions regarding the probability of success. It hasn't been developed into the specifics enough to really have a firm and definite conviction, but there is a substantial amount there underlying it to warrant those claims, both as to the fraud, the preference, the breach of fiduciary duty. There is some natural overlay between those claims and the claim objections, and indeed, I believe it was discussed and part of the concern of going with the claim objection was that there was that natural overlay. The Court is not stating or opining on any issue, preclusive effect to be given, but there is enough there to support that there's something there.

Again, the Court finds that the time and cost of that would be significant. I think that the time and cost of the claim objection can be used as a proxy in that regard, and that has taken a couple of years. So that also supports the settlement of the claims.

The collection is uncertain. I have heard no real -- no discussion from -- about Dr. Seal's or -- and his wife's

2.

2.2

2.3

2.4

financial condition to recover any amounts from them, the time and effort it would take to recover that. So that's a fairly neutral.

As for the best interest of the creditors I'll say that GLA is overwhelmingly the significant creditor. They have not — they were, unfortunately for them, not the successful bidder, but their participation in the sale and the lack of any objection to the sale strongly supports the sale and compromise of these assets as they will reap the most significant benefit out of this transaction. So for all these reasons, the Court finds that the sale is in the best interest and under (a) and (c), any need to analyze this transaction as a settlement under 9019 would meet those factors, and quite honestly, there's really nothing to detract from the finding of the compromise being in the best interest of the estate, and the auction largely bears that out.

That will constitute the Court's findings of facts and conclusions of law as to the standards to be applied and findings necessary to support the Court's ruling, approving the motion to sell and compromise as needed. So Mr. Lehners, we'll go ahead and charge you with preparing the appropriate order, getting the necessary sign offs, and I look forward to receiving that in due course.

MR. LEHNERS: Your Honor, I will get right on that.

I also believe we did have an adversary scheduling

```
conference --
 1
 2
              THE COURT: Status.
              MR. LEHNERS: -- today, and there's probably some
 3
    matters to take up with that. But we could push it to tomorrow
 4
    if you wish. Since Ms. Tirre is the high bidder, we can deal
 5
    with it now. Whatever your pleasure.
 6
 7
              THE COURT: Why don't you have a chat on the way out
 8
    with Ms. Tirre? But I assume that she's going to want to get
 9
    some, you know, some time underneath it before we actually make
10
    any decisions on how it's going to proceed. So what I would
11
    suggest is that you talk about the next opportunity that the
12
    parties want to set the status and scheduling.
13
              MR. LEHNERS: Of course, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: So Ms. Tirre, Mr. Lindersmith is
14
15
    concerned that I have the Chapter 7 Vegas duty calendar at 11.
16
    I can't imagine that it's going to run -- they're -- it's
17
    short. So I am comfortable setting it on for 11:30 because I
18
    don't think it's going to -- go ahead. I don't think it's
19
    going to impact that, but if I'm talking when you come in, that
20
    is why, and it should be done prior to 11:30, I believe.
21
              MS. TIRRE: Thank you. I just double checked my
2.2
    doctor's appointment. It's actually 10:30.
2.3
              THE COURT: Okay.
2.4
              MS. TIRRE: It's about a ten-minute drive from here.
25
    It's fine with me if it's noon. I didn't hear anything from my
```

```
client. I don't know if the Court will work over the noon hour
 1
 2
    or not.
              THE COURT: Well, no, no. I -- I'll have to start
 3
    heading to the airport, but --
 4
 5
              MS. TIRRE: Oh.
              THE COURT: -- 11:30, I imagine the eleven o'clock
 6
    calendar should be done by 11:20.
 7
              MS. TIRRE: Got it.
 8
 9
              THE COURT: I'm expecting a half hour for this, quite
10
    honestly, and then will be --
11
              MS. TIRRE: Okay. I will be here at 11:30.
12
              THE COURT: All right.
13
              MS. TIRRE: Thank you.
              THE COURT: Thank you.
14
15
              THE CLERK: The only impact may be that I may have to
16
    just start the Zoom meeting a few minutes late.
17
              THE COURT: Yeah, if it runs, it'll take a moment.
18
              THE CLERK:
                         If the duty judge calendar runs long,
19
    just so that everyone knows.
20
              MS. TIRRE: Thank you.
21
              THE COURT: Yeah. All right. For the good of order,
22
    anyone else need to raise any points before we adjourn?
2.3
              All right. Thank you very much. I know it was a
2.4
    lengthy process, but I think it was effective. I appreciate
25
    the professionalism, and I -- I'm glad to have seen everyone.
```

```
1
    So we're adjourned.
 2
              MR. OINES: Thank you, Your Honor.
 3
              MR. LEHNERS: Thank you, Your Honor.
 4
              THE CLERK: Please rise.
 5
         (Proceedings concluded at 3:13 p.m.)
 6
 7
 8
 9
10
11
12
13
14
                       CERTIFICATION
15
16
              I, Alicia Jarrett, court-approved transcriber, hereby
17
    certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the
18
    official electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the
19
    above-entitled matter.
20
21
          Ulicia J. farrets
22
23
2.4
    ALICIA JARRETT, AAERT NO. 428
                                  DATE: May 17, 2023
25
    ACCESS TRANSCRIPTS, LLC
```